🤖
hacktricks
  • 👾Welcome!
    • HackTricks
    • HackTricks Values & FAQ
    • About the author
  • 🤩Generic Methodologies & Resources
    • Pentesting Methodology
    • External Recon Methodology
      • Wide Source Code Search
      • Github Dorks & Leaks
    • Pentesting Network
      • DHCPv6
      • EIGRP Attacks
      • GLBP & HSRP Attacks
      • IDS and IPS Evasion
      • Lateral VLAN Segmentation Bypass
      • Network Protocols Explained (ESP)
      • Nmap Summary (ESP)
      • Pentesting IPv6
      • WebRTC DoS
      • Spoofing LLMNR, NBT-NS, mDNS/DNS and WPAD and Relay Attacks
      • Spoofing SSDP and UPnP Devices with EvilSSDP
    • Pentesting Wifi
      • Evil Twin EAP-TLS
    • Phishing Methodology
      • Clone a Website
      • Detecting Phishing
      • Phishing Files & Documents
    • Basic Forensic Methodology
      • Baseline Monitoring
      • Anti-Forensic Techniques
      • Docker Forensics
      • Image Acquisition & Mount
      • Linux Forensics
      • Malware Analysis
      • Memory dump analysis
        • Volatility - CheatSheet
      • Partitions/File Systems/Carving
        • File/Data Carving & Recovery Tools
      • Pcap Inspection
        • DNSCat pcap analysis
        • Suricata & Iptables cheatsheet
        • USB Keystrokes
        • Wifi Pcap Analysis
        • Wireshark tricks
      • Specific Software/File-Type Tricks
        • Decompile compiled python binaries (exe, elf) - Retreive from .pyc
        • Browser Artifacts
        • Deofuscation vbs (cscript.exe)
        • Local Cloud Storage
        • Office file analysis
        • PDF File analysis
        • PNG tricks
        • Video and Audio file analysis
        • ZIPs tricks
      • Windows Artifacts
        • Interesting Windows Registry Keys
    • Brute Force - CheatSheet
    • Python Sandbox Escape & Pyscript
      • Bypass Python sandboxes
        • LOAD_NAME / LOAD_CONST opcode OOB Read
      • Class Pollution (Python's Prototype Pollution)
      • Python Internal Read Gadgets
      • Pyscript
      • venv
      • Web Requests
      • Bruteforce hash (few chars)
      • Basic Python
    • Exfiltration
    • Tunneling and Port Forwarding
    • Threat Modeling
    • Search Exploits
    • Reverse Shells (Linux, Windows, MSFVenom)
      • MSFVenom - CheatSheet
      • Reverse Shells - Windows
      • Reverse Shells - Linux
      • Full TTYs
  • 🐧Linux Hardening
    • Checklist - Linux Privilege Escalation
    • Linux Privilege Escalation
      • Arbitrary File Write to Root
      • Cisco - vmanage
      • Containerd (ctr) Privilege Escalation
      • D-Bus Enumeration & Command Injection Privilege Escalation
      • Docker Security
        • Abusing Docker Socket for Privilege Escalation
        • AppArmor
        • AuthZ& AuthN - Docker Access Authorization Plugin
        • CGroups
        • Docker --privileged
        • Docker Breakout / Privilege Escalation
          • release_agent exploit - Relative Paths to PIDs
          • Docker release_agent cgroups escape
          • Sensitive Mounts
        • Namespaces
          • CGroup Namespace
          • IPC Namespace
          • PID Namespace
          • Mount Namespace
          • Network Namespace
          • Time Namespace
          • User Namespace
          • UTS Namespace
        • Seccomp
        • Weaponizing Distroless
      • Escaping from Jails
      • euid, ruid, suid
      • Interesting Groups - Linux Privesc
        • lxd/lxc Group - Privilege escalation
      • Logstash
      • ld.so privesc exploit example
      • Linux Active Directory
      • Linux Capabilities
      • NFS no_root_squash/no_all_squash misconfiguration PE
      • Node inspector/CEF debug abuse
      • Payloads to execute
      • RunC Privilege Escalation
      • SELinux
      • Socket Command Injection
      • Splunk LPE and Persistence
      • SSH Forward Agent exploitation
      • Wildcards Spare tricks
    • Useful Linux Commands
    • Bypass Linux Restrictions
      • Bypass FS protections: read-only / no-exec / Distroless
        • DDexec / EverythingExec
    • Linux Environment Variables
    • Linux Post-Exploitation
      • PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules
    • FreeIPA Pentesting
  • 🍏MacOS Hardening
    • macOS Security & Privilege Escalation
      • macOS Apps - Inspecting, debugging and Fuzzing
        • Objects in memory
        • Introduction to x64
        • Introduction to ARM64v8
      • macOS AppleFS
      • macOS Bypassing Firewalls
      • macOS Defensive Apps
      • macOS GCD - Grand Central Dispatch
      • macOS Kernel & System Extensions
        • macOS IOKit
        • macOS Kernel Extensions & Debugging
        • macOS Kernel Vulnerabilities
        • macOS System Extensions
      • macOS Network Services & Protocols
      • macOS File Extension & URL scheme app handlers
      • macOS Files, Folders, Binaries & Memory
        • macOS Bundles
        • macOS Installers Abuse
        • macOS Memory Dumping
        • macOS Sensitive Locations & Interesting Daemons
        • macOS Universal binaries & Mach-O Format
      • macOS Objective-C
      • macOS Privilege Escalation
      • macOS Process Abuse
        • macOS Dirty NIB
        • macOS Chromium Injection
        • macOS Electron Applications Injection
        • macOS Function Hooking
        • macOS IPC - Inter Process Communication
          • macOS MIG - Mach Interface Generator
          • macOS XPC
            • macOS XPC Authorization
            • macOS XPC Connecting Process Check
              • macOS PID Reuse
              • macOS xpc_connection_get_audit_token Attack
          • macOS Thread Injection via Task port
        • macOS Java Applications Injection
        • macOS Library Injection
          • macOS Dyld Hijacking & DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
          • macOS Dyld Process
        • macOS Perl Applications Injection
        • macOS Python Applications Injection
        • macOS Ruby Applications Injection
        • macOS .Net Applications Injection
      • macOS Security Protections
        • macOS Gatekeeper / Quarantine / XProtect
        • macOS Launch/Environment Constraints & Trust Cache
        • macOS Sandbox
          • macOS Default Sandbox Debug
          • macOS Sandbox Debug & Bypass
            • macOS Office Sandbox Bypasses
        • macOS Authorizations DB & Authd
        • macOS SIP
        • macOS TCC
          • macOS Apple Events
          • macOS TCC Bypasses
            • macOS Apple Scripts
          • macOS TCC Payloads
        • macOS Dangerous Entitlements & TCC perms
        • macOS - AMFI - AppleMobileFileIntegrity
        • macOS MACF - Mandatory Access Control Framework
        • macOS Code Signing
        • macOS FS Tricks
          • macOS xattr-acls extra stuff
      • macOS Users & External Accounts
    • macOS Red Teaming
      • macOS MDM
        • Enrolling Devices in Other Organisations
        • macOS Serial Number
      • macOS Keychain
    • macOS Useful Commands
    • macOS Auto Start
  • 🪟Windows Hardening
    • Checklist - Local Windows Privilege Escalation
    • Windows Local Privilege Escalation
      • Abusing Tokens
      • Access Tokens
      • ACLs - DACLs/SACLs/ACEs
      • AppendData/AddSubdirectory permission over service registry
      • Create MSI with WIX
      • COM Hijacking
      • Dll Hijacking
        • Writable Sys Path +Dll Hijacking Privesc
      • DPAPI - Extracting Passwords
      • From High Integrity to SYSTEM with Name Pipes
      • Integrity Levels
      • JuicyPotato
      • Leaked Handle Exploitation
      • MSI Wrapper
      • Named Pipe Client Impersonation
      • Privilege Escalation with Autoruns
      • RoguePotato, PrintSpoofer, SharpEfsPotato, GodPotato
      • SeDebug + SeImpersonate copy token
      • SeImpersonate from High To System
      • Windows C Payloads
    • Active Directory Methodology
      • Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
        • Shadow Credentials
      • AD Certificates
        • AD CS Account Persistence
        • AD CS Domain Escalation
        • AD CS Domain Persistence
        • AD CS Certificate Theft
      • AD information in printers
      • AD DNS Records
      • ASREPRoast
      • BloodHound & Other AD Enum Tools
      • Constrained Delegation
      • Custom SSP
      • DCShadow
      • DCSync
      • Diamond Ticket
      • DSRM Credentials
      • External Forest Domain - OneWay (Inbound) or bidirectional
      • External Forest Domain - One-Way (Outbound)
      • Golden Ticket
      • Kerberoast
      • Kerberos Authentication
      • Kerberos Double Hop Problem
      • LAPS
      • MSSQL AD Abuse
      • Over Pass the Hash/Pass the Key
      • Pass the Ticket
      • Password Spraying / Brute Force
      • PrintNightmare
      • Force NTLM Privileged Authentication
      • Privileged Groups
      • RDP Sessions Abuse
      • Resource-based Constrained Delegation
      • Security Descriptors
      • SID-History Injection
      • Silver Ticket
      • Skeleton Key
      • Unconstrained Delegation
    • Windows Security Controls
      • UAC - User Account Control
    • NTLM
      • Places to steal NTLM creds
    • Lateral Movement
      • AtExec / SchtasksExec
      • DCOM Exec
      • PsExec/Winexec/ScExec
      • SmbExec/ScExec
      • WinRM
      • WmiExec
    • Pivoting to the Cloud
    • Stealing Windows Credentials
      • Windows Credentials Protections
      • Mimikatz
      • WTS Impersonator
    • Basic Win CMD for Pentesters
    • Basic PowerShell for Pentesters
      • PowerView/SharpView
    • Antivirus (AV) Bypass
  • 📱Mobile Pentesting
    • Android APK Checklist
    • Android Applications Pentesting
      • Android Applications Basics
      • Android Task Hijacking
      • ADB Commands
      • APK decompilers
      • AVD - Android Virtual Device
      • Bypass Biometric Authentication (Android)
      • content:// protocol
      • Drozer Tutorial
        • Exploiting Content Providers
      • Exploiting a debuggeable application
      • Frida Tutorial
        • Frida Tutorial 1
        • Frida Tutorial 2
        • Frida Tutorial 3
        • Objection Tutorial
      • Google CTF 2018 - Shall We Play a Game?
      • Install Burp Certificate
      • Intent Injection
      • Make APK Accept CA Certificate
      • Manual DeObfuscation
      • React Native Application
      • Reversing Native Libraries
      • Smali - Decompiling/[Modifying]/Compiling
      • Spoofing your location in Play Store
      • Tapjacking
      • Webview Attacks
    • iOS Pentesting Checklist
    • iOS Pentesting
      • iOS App Extensions
      • iOS Basics
      • iOS Basic Testing Operations
      • iOS Burp Suite Configuration
      • iOS Custom URI Handlers / Deeplinks / Custom Schemes
      • iOS Extracting Entitlements From Compiled Application
      • iOS Frida Configuration
      • iOS Hooking With Objection
      • iOS Protocol Handlers
      • iOS Serialisation and Encoding
      • iOS Testing Environment
      • iOS UIActivity Sharing
      • iOS Universal Links
      • iOS UIPasteboard
      • iOS WebViews
    • Cordova Apps
    • Xamarin Apps
  • 👽Network Services Pentesting
    • Pentesting JDWP - Java Debug Wire Protocol
    • Pentesting Printers
    • Pentesting SAP
    • Pentesting VoIP
      • Basic VoIP Protocols
        • SIP (Session Initiation Protocol)
    • Pentesting Remote GdbServer
    • 7/tcp/udp - Pentesting Echo
    • 21 - Pentesting FTP
      • FTP Bounce attack - Scan
      • FTP Bounce - Download 2ºFTP file
    • 22 - Pentesting SSH/SFTP
    • 23 - Pentesting Telnet
    • 25,465,587 - Pentesting SMTP/s
      • SMTP Smuggling
      • SMTP - Commands
    • 43 - Pentesting WHOIS
    • 49 - Pentesting TACACS+
    • 53 - Pentesting DNS
    • 69/UDP TFTP/Bittorrent-tracker
    • 79 - Pentesting Finger
    • 80,443 - Pentesting Web Methodology
      • 403 & 401 Bypasses
      • AEM - Adobe Experience Cloud
      • Angular
      • Apache
      • Artifactory Hacking guide
      • Bolt CMS
      • Buckets
        • Firebase Database
      • CGI
      • DotNetNuke (DNN)
      • Drupal
        • Drupal RCE
      • Electron Desktop Apps
        • Electron contextIsolation RCE via preload code
        • Electron contextIsolation RCE via Electron internal code
        • Electron contextIsolation RCE via IPC
      • Flask
      • NodeJS Express
      • Git
      • Golang
      • GWT - Google Web Toolkit
      • Grafana
      • GraphQL
      • H2 - Java SQL database
      • IIS - Internet Information Services
      • ImageMagick Security
      • JBOSS
      • Jira & Confluence
      • Joomla
      • JSP
      • Laravel
      • Moodle
      • Nginx
      • NextJS
      • PHP Tricks
        • PHP - Useful Functions & disable_functions/open_basedir bypass
          • disable_functions bypass - php-fpm/FastCGI
          • disable_functions bypass - dl function
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP 7.0-7.4 (*nix only)
          • disable_functions bypass - Imagick <= 3.3.0 PHP >= 5.4 Exploit
          • disable_functions - PHP 5.x Shellshock Exploit
          • disable_functions - PHP 5.2.4 ionCube extension Exploit
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP <= 5.2.9 on windows
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP 5.2.4 and 5.2.5 PHP cURL
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP safe_mode bypass via proc_open() and custom environment Exploit
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP Perl Extension Safe_mode Bypass Exploit
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP 5.2.3 - Win32std ext Protections Bypass
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP 5.2 - FOpen Exploit
          • disable_functions bypass - via mem
          • disable_functions bypass - mod_cgi
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP 4 >= 4.2.0, PHP 5 pcntl_exec
        • PHP - RCE abusing object creation: new $_GET["a"]($_GET["b"])
        • PHP SSRF
      • PrestaShop
      • Python
      • Rocket Chat
      • Special HTTP headers
      • Source code Review / SAST Tools
      • Spring Actuators
      • Symfony
      • Tomcat
        • Basic Tomcat Info
      • Uncovering CloudFlare
      • VMWare (ESX, VCenter...)
      • Web API Pentesting
      • WebDav
      • Werkzeug / Flask Debug
      • Wordpress
    • 88tcp/udp - Pentesting Kerberos
      • Harvesting tickets from Windows
      • Harvesting tickets from Linux
    • 110,995 - Pentesting POP
    • 111/TCP/UDP - Pentesting Portmapper
    • 113 - Pentesting Ident
    • 123/udp - Pentesting NTP
    • 135, 593 - Pentesting MSRPC
    • 137,138,139 - Pentesting NetBios
    • 139,445 - Pentesting SMB
      • rpcclient enumeration
    • 143,993 - Pentesting IMAP
    • 161,162,10161,10162/udp - Pentesting SNMP
      • Cisco SNMP
      • SNMP RCE
    • 194,6667,6660-7000 - Pentesting IRC
    • 264 - Pentesting Check Point FireWall-1
    • 389, 636, 3268, 3269 - Pentesting LDAP
    • 500/udp - Pentesting IPsec/IKE VPN
    • 502 - Pentesting Modbus
    • 512 - Pentesting Rexec
    • 513 - Pentesting Rlogin
    • 514 - Pentesting Rsh
    • 515 - Pentesting Line Printer Daemon (LPD)
    • 548 - Pentesting Apple Filing Protocol (AFP)
    • 554,8554 - Pentesting RTSP
    • 623/UDP/TCP - IPMI
    • 631 - Internet Printing Protocol(IPP)
    • 700 - Pentesting EPP
    • 873 - Pentesting Rsync
    • 1026 - Pentesting Rusersd
    • 1080 - Pentesting Socks
    • 1098/1099/1050 - Pentesting Java RMI - RMI-IIOP
    • 1414 - Pentesting IBM MQ
    • 1433 - Pentesting MSSQL - Microsoft SQL Server
      • Types of MSSQL Users
    • 1521,1522-1529 - Pentesting Oracle TNS Listener
    • 1723 - Pentesting PPTP
    • 1883 - Pentesting MQTT (Mosquitto)
    • 2049 - Pentesting NFS Service
    • 2301,2381 - Pentesting Compaq/HP Insight Manager
    • 2375, 2376 Pentesting Docker
    • 3128 - Pentesting Squid
    • 3260 - Pentesting ISCSI
    • 3299 - Pentesting SAPRouter
    • 3306 - Pentesting Mysql
    • 3389 - Pentesting RDP
    • 3632 - Pentesting distcc
    • 3690 - Pentesting Subversion (svn server)
    • 3702/UDP - Pentesting WS-Discovery
    • 4369 - Pentesting Erlang Port Mapper Daemon (epmd)
    • 4786 - Cisco Smart Install
    • 4840 - OPC Unified Architecture
    • 5000 - Pentesting Docker Registry
    • 5353/UDP Multicast DNS (mDNS) and DNS-SD
    • 5432,5433 - Pentesting Postgresql
    • 5439 - Pentesting Redshift
    • 5555 - Android Debug Bridge
    • 5601 - Pentesting Kibana
    • 5671,5672 - Pentesting AMQP
    • 5800,5801,5900,5901 - Pentesting VNC
    • 5984,6984 - Pentesting CouchDB
    • 5985,5986 - Pentesting WinRM
    • 5985,5986 - Pentesting OMI
    • 6000 - Pentesting X11
    • 6379 - Pentesting Redis
    • 8009 - Pentesting Apache JServ Protocol (AJP)
    • 8086 - Pentesting InfluxDB
    • 8089 - Pentesting Splunkd
    • 8333,18333,38333,18444 - Pentesting Bitcoin
    • 9000 - Pentesting FastCGI
    • 9001 - Pentesting HSQLDB
    • 9042/9160 - Pentesting Cassandra
    • 9100 - Pentesting Raw Printing (JetDirect, AppSocket, PDL-datastream)
    • 9200 - Pentesting Elasticsearch
    • 10000 - Pentesting Network Data Management Protocol (ndmp)
    • 11211 - Pentesting Memcache
      • Memcache Commands
    • 15672 - Pentesting RabbitMQ Management
    • 24007,24008,24009,49152 - Pentesting GlusterFS
    • 27017,27018 - Pentesting MongoDB
    • 44134 - Pentesting Tiller (Helm)
    • 44818/UDP/TCP - Pentesting EthernetIP
    • 47808/udp - Pentesting BACNet
    • 50030,50060,50070,50075,50090 - Pentesting Hadoop
  • 🕸️Pentesting Web
    • Web Vulnerabilities Methodology
    • Reflecting Techniques - PoCs and Polygloths CheatSheet
      • Web Vulns List
    • 2FA/MFA/OTP Bypass
    • Account Takeover
    • Browser Extension Pentesting Methodology
      • BrowExt - ClickJacking
      • BrowExt - permissions & host_permissions
      • BrowExt - XSS Example
    • Bypass Payment Process
    • Captcha Bypass
    • Cache Poisoning and Cache Deception
      • Cache Poisoning via URL discrepancies
      • Cache Poisoning to DoS
    • Clickjacking
    • Client Side Template Injection (CSTI)
    • Client Side Path Traversal
    • Command Injection
    • Content Security Policy (CSP) Bypass
      • CSP bypass: self + 'unsafe-inline' with Iframes
    • Cookies Hacking
      • Cookie Tossing
      • Cookie Jar Overflow
      • Cookie Bomb
    • CORS - Misconfigurations & Bypass
    • CRLF (%0D%0A) Injection
    • CSRF (Cross Site Request Forgery)
    • Dangling Markup - HTML scriptless injection
      • SS-Leaks
    • Dependency Confusion
    • Deserialization
      • NodeJS - __proto__ & prototype Pollution
        • Client Side Prototype Pollution
        • Express Prototype Pollution Gadgets
        • Prototype Pollution to RCE
      • Java JSF ViewState (.faces) Deserialization
      • Java DNS Deserialization, GadgetProbe and Java Deserialization Scanner
      • Basic Java Deserialization (ObjectInputStream, readObject)
      • PHP - Deserialization + Autoload Classes
      • CommonsCollection1 Payload - Java Transformers to Rutime exec() and Thread Sleep
      • Basic .Net deserialization (ObjectDataProvider gadget, ExpandedWrapper, and Json.Net)
      • Exploiting __VIEWSTATE knowing the secrets
      • Exploiting __VIEWSTATE without knowing the secrets
      • Python Yaml Deserialization
      • JNDI - Java Naming and Directory Interface & Log4Shell
      • Ruby Class Pollution
    • Domain/Subdomain takeover
    • Email Injections
    • File Inclusion/Path traversal
      • phar:// deserialization
      • LFI2RCE via PHP Filters
      • LFI2RCE via Nginx temp files
      • LFI2RCE via PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS
      • LFI2RCE via Segmentation Fault
      • LFI2RCE via phpinfo()
      • LFI2RCE Via temp file uploads
      • LFI2RCE via Eternal waiting
      • LFI2RCE Via compress.zlib + PHP_STREAM_PREFER_STUDIO + Path Disclosure
    • File Upload
      • PDF Upload - XXE and CORS bypass
    • Formula/CSV/Doc/LaTeX/GhostScript Injection
    • gRPC-Web Pentest
    • HTTP Connection Contamination
    • HTTP Connection Request Smuggling
    • HTTP Request Smuggling / HTTP Desync Attack
      • Browser HTTP Request Smuggling
      • Request Smuggling in HTTP/2 Downgrades
    • HTTP Response Smuggling / Desync
    • Upgrade Header Smuggling
    • hop-by-hop headers
    • IDOR
    • JWT Vulnerabilities (Json Web Tokens)
    • LDAP Injection
    • Login Bypass
      • Login bypass List
    • NoSQL injection
    • OAuth to Account takeover
    • Open Redirect
    • ORM Injection
    • Parameter Pollution
    • Phone Number Injections
    • PostMessage Vulnerabilities
      • Blocking main page to steal postmessage
      • Bypassing SOP with Iframes - 1
      • Bypassing SOP with Iframes - 2
      • Steal postmessage modifying iframe location
    • Proxy / WAF Protections Bypass
    • Race Condition
    • Rate Limit Bypass
    • Registration & Takeover Vulnerabilities
    • Regular expression Denial of Service - ReDoS
    • Reset/Forgotten Password Bypass
    • Reverse Tab Nabbing
    • SAML Attacks
      • SAML Basics
    • Server Side Inclusion/Edge Side Inclusion Injection
    • SQL Injection
      • MS Access SQL Injection
      • MSSQL Injection
      • MySQL injection
        • MySQL File priv to SSRF/RCE
      • Oracle injection
      • Cypher Injection (neo4j)
      • PostgreSQL injection
        • dblink/lo_import data exfiltration
        • PL/pgSQL Password Bruteforce
        • Network - Privesc, Port Scanner and NTLM chanllenge response disclosure
        • Big Binary Files Upload (PostgreSQL)
        • RCE with PostgreSQL Languages
        • RCE with PostgreSQL Extensions
      • SQLMap - CheatSheet
        • Second Order Injection - SQLMap
    • SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery)
      • URL Format Bypass
      • SSRF Vulnerable Platforms
      • Cloud SSRF
    • SSTI (Server Side Template Injection)
      • EL - Expression Language
      • Jinja2 SSTI
    • Timing Attacks
    • Unicode Injection
      • Unicode Normalization
    • UUID Insecurities
    • WebSocket Attacks
    • Web Tool - WFuzz
    • XPATH injection
    • XSLT Server Side Injection (Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations)
    • XXE - XEE - XML External Entity
    • XSS (Cross Site Scripting)
      • Abusing Service Workers
      • Chrome Cache to XSS
      • Debugging Client Side JS
      • Dom Clobbering
      • DOM Invader
      • DOM XSS
      • Iframes in XSS, CSP and SOP
      • Integer Overflow
      • JS Hoisting
      • Misc JS Tricks & Relevant Info
      • PDF Injection
      • Server Side XSS (Dynamic PDF)
      • Shadow DOM
      • SOME - Same Origin Method Execution
      • Sniff Leak
      • Steal Info JS
      • XSS in Markdown
    • XSSI (Cross-Site Script Inclusion)
    • XS-Search/XS-Leaks
      • Connection Pool Examples
      • Connection Pool by Destination Example
      • Cookie Bomb + Onerror XS Leak
      • URL Max Length - Client Side
      • performance.now example
      • performance.now + Force heavy task
      • Event Loop Blocking + Lazy images
      • JavaScript Execution XS Leak
      • CSS Injection
        • CSS Injection Code
    • Iframe Traps
  • ⛈️Cloud Security
    • Pentesting Kubernetes
    • Pentesting Cloud (AWS, GCP, Az...)
    • Pentesting CI/CD (Github, Jenkins, Terraform...)
  • 😎Hardware/Physical Access
    • Physical Attacks
    • Escaping from KIOSKs
    • Firmware Analysis
      • Bootloader testing
      • Firmware Integrity
  • 🎯Binary Exploitation
    • Basic Stack Binary Exploitation Methodology
      • ELF Basic Information
      • Exploiting Tools
        • PwnTools
    • Stack Overflow
      • Pointer Redirecting
      • Ret2win
        • Ret2win - arm64
      • Stack Shellcode
        • Stack Shellcode - arm64
      • Stack Pivoting - EBP2Ret - EBP chaining
      • Uninitialized Variables
    • ROP - Return Oriented Programing
      • BROP - Blind Return Oriented Programming
      • Ret2csu
      • Ret2dlresolve
      • Ret2esp / Ret2reg
      • Ret2lib
        • Leaking libc address with ROP
          • Leaking libc - template
        • One Gadget
        • Ret2lib + Printf leak - arm64
      • Ret2syscall
        • Ret2syscall - ARM64
      • Ret2vDSO
      • SROP - Sigreturn-Oriented Programming
        • SROP - ARM64
    • Array Indexing
    • Integer Overflow
    • Format Strings
      • Format Strings - Arbitrary Read Example
      • Format Strings Template
    • Libc Heap
      • Bins & Memory Allocations
      • Heap Memory Functions
        • free
        • malloc & sysmalloc
        • unlink
        • Heap Functions Security Checks
      • Use After Free
        • First Fit
      • Double Free
      • Overwriting a freed chunk
      • Heap Overflow
      • Unlink Attack
      • Fast Bin Attack
      • Unsorted Bin Attack
      • Large Bin Attack
      • Tcache Bin Attack
      • Off by one overflow
      • House of Spirit
      • House of Lore | Small bin Attack
      • House of Einherjar
      • House of Force
      • House of Orange
      • House of Rabbit
      • House of Roman
    • Common Binary Exploitation Protections & Bypasses
      • ASLR
        • Ret2plt
        • Ret2ret & Reo2pop
      • CET & Shadow Stack
      • Libc Protections
      • Memory Tagging Extension (MTE)
      • No-exec / NX
      • PIE
        • BF Addresses in the Stack
      • Relro
      • Stack Canaries
        • BF Forked & Threaded Stack Canaries
        • Print Stack Canary
    • Write What Where 2 Exec
      • WWW2Exec - atexit()
      • WWW2Exec - .dtors & .fini_array
      • WWW2Exec - GOT/PLT
      • WWW2Exec - __malloc_hook & __free_hook
    • Common Exploiting Problems
    • Windows Exploiting (Basic Guide - OSCP lvl)
    • iOS Exploiting
  • 🔩Reversing
    • Reversing Tools & Basic Methods
      • Angr
        • Angr - Examples
      • Z3 - Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT)
      • Cheat Engine
      • Blobrunner
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On this page
  • Basic Information
  • Tcache (Per-Thread Cache) Bins
  • Fast bins
  • Unsorted bin
  • Small Bins
  • Large bins
  • Top Chunk
  • Last Remainder
  • Allocation Flow
  • Free Flow
  • Heap Functions Security Checks
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  1. Binary Exploitation
  2. Libc Heap

Bins & Memory Allocations

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Last updated 7 months ago

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Basic Information

In order to improve the efficiency on how chunks are stored every chunk is not just in one linked list, but there are several types. These are the bins and there are 5 type of bins: small bins, 63 large bins, 1 unsorted bin, 10 fast bins and 64 tcache bins per thread.

The initial address to each unsorted, small and large bins is inside the same array. The index 0 is unused, 1 is the unsorted bin, bins 2-64 are small bins and bins 65-127 are large bins.

Tcache (Per-Thread Cache) Bins

Even though threads try to have their own heap (see and ), there is the possibility that a process with a lot of threads (like a web server) will end sharing the heap with another threads. In this case, the main solution is the use of lockers, which might slow down significantly the threads.

Therefore, a tcache is similar to a fast bin per thread in the way that it's a single linked list that doesn't merge chunks. Each thread has 64 singly-linked tcache bins. Each bin can have a maximum of ranging from .

When a thread frees a chunk, if it isn't too big to be allocated in the tcache and the respective tcache bin isn't full (already 7 chunks), it'll be allocated in there. If it cannot go to the tcache, it'll need to wait for the heap lock to be able to perform the free operation globally.

When a chunk is allocated, if there is a free chunk of the needed size in the Tcache it'll use it, if not, it'll need to wait for the heap lock to be able to find one in the global bins or create a new one. There's also an optimization, in this case, while having the heap lock, the thread will fill his Tcache with heap chunks (7) of the requested size, so in case it needs more, it'll find them in Tcache.

Add a tcache chunk example
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h> 

int main(void) 
{
  char *chunk;
  chunk = malloc(24);
  printf("Address of the chunk: %p\n", (void *)chunk);
  gets(chunk);
  free(chunk);
  return 0;
}

Compile it and debug it with a breakpoint in the ret opcode from main function. then with gef you can see the tcache bin in use:

gef➤  heap bins
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Tcachebins for thread 1 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Tcachebins[idx=0, size=0x20, count=1] ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac12a0, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA) 

Tcache Structs & Functions

In the following code it's possible to see the max bins and chunks per index, the tcache_entry struct created to avoid double frees and tcache_perthread_struct, a struct that each thread uses to store the addresses to each index of the bin.

tcache_entry and tcache_perthread_struct
// From https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/f942a732d37a96217ef828116ebe64a644db18d7/malloc/malloc.c

/* We want 64 entries.  This is an arbitrary limit, which tunables can reduce.  */
# define TCACHE_MAX_BINS		64
# define MAX_TCACHE_SIZE	tidx2usize (TCACHE_MAX_BINS-1)

/* Only used to pre-fill the tunables.  */
# define tidx2usize(idx)	(((size_t) idx) * MALLOC_ALIGNMENT + MINSIZE - SIZE_SZ)

/* When "x" is from chunksize().  */
# define csize2tidx(x) (((x) - MINSIZE + MALLOC_ALIGNMENT - 1) / MALLOC_ALIGNMENT)
/* When "x" is a user-provided size.  */
# define usize2tidx(x) csize2tidx (request2size (x))

/* With rounding and alignment, the bins are...
   idx 0   bytes 0..24 (64-bit) or 0..12 (32-bit)
   idx 1   bytes 25..40 or 13..20
   idx 2   bytes 41..56 or 21..28
   etc.  */

/* This is another arbitrary limit, which tunables can change.  Each
   tcache bin will hold at most this number of chunks.  */
# define TCACHE_FILL_COUNT 7

/* Maximum chunks in tcache bins for tunables.  This value must fit the range
   of tcache->counts[] entries, else they may overflow.  */
# define MAX_TCACHE_COUNT UINT16_MAX

[...]

typedef struct tcache_entry
{
  struct tcache_entry *next;
  /* This field exists to detect double frees.  */
  uintptr_t key;
} tcache_entry;

/* There is one of these for each thread, which contains the
   per-thread cache (hence "tcache_perthread_struct").  Keeping
   overall size low is mildly important.  Note that COUNTS and ENTRIES
   are redundant (we could have just counted the linked list each
   time), this is for performance reasons.  */
typedef struct tcache_perthread_struct
{
  uint16_t counts[TCACHE_MAX_BINS];
  tcache_entry *entries[TCACHE_MAX_BINS];
} tcache_perthread_struct;

The function __tcache_init is the function that creates and allocates the space for the tcache_perthread_struct obj

tcache_init code
// From https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/f942a732d37a96217ef828116ebe64a644db18d7/malloc/malloc.c#L3241C1-L3274C2

static void
tcache_init(void)
{
  mstate ar_ptr;
  void *victim = 0;
  const size_t bytes = sizeof (tcache_perthread_struct);

  if (tcache_shutting_down)
    return;

  arena_get (ar_ptr, bytes);
  victim = _int_malloc (ar_ptr, bytes);
  if (!victim && ar_ptr != NULL)
    {
      ar_ptr = arena_get_retry (ar_ptr, bytes);
      victim = _int_malloc (ar_ptr, bytes);
    }


  if (ar_ptr != NULL)
    __libc_lock_unlock (ar_ptr->mutex);

  /* In a low memory situation, we may not be able to allocate memory
     - in which case, we just keep trying later.  However, we
     typically do this very early, so either there is sufficient
     memory, or there isn't enough memory to do non-trivial
     allocations anyway.  */
  if (victim)
    {
      tcache = (tcache_perthread_struct *) victim;
      memset (tcache, 0, sizeof (tcache_perthread_struct));
    }

}

Tcache Indexes

The tcache have several bins depending on the size an the initial pointers to the first chunk of each index and the amount of chunks per index are located inside a chunk. This means that locating the chunk with this information (usually the first), it's possible to find all the tcache initial points and the amount of Tcache chunks.

Fast bins

Fast bins are designed to speed up memory allocation for small chunks by keeping recently freed chunks in a quick-access structure. These bins use a Last-In, First-Out (LIFO) approach, which means that the most recently freed chunk is the first to be reused when there's a new allocation request. This behaviour is advantageous for speed, as it's faster to insert and remove from the top of a stack (LIFO) compared to a queue (FIFO).

Additionally, fast bins use singly linked lists, not double linked, which further improves speed. Since chunks in fast bins aren't merged with neighbours, there's no need for a complex structure that allows removal from the middle. A singly linked list is simpler and quicker for these operations.

Basically, what happens here is that the header (the pointer to the first chunk to check) is always pointing to the latest freed chunk of that size. So:

  • When a new chunk is allocated of that size, the header is pointing to a free chunk to use. As this free chunk is pointing to the next one to use, this address is stored in the header so the next allocation knows where to get an available chunk

  • When a chunk is freed, the free chunk will save the address to the current available chunk and the address to this newly freed chunk will be put in the header

The maximum size of a linked list is 0x80 and they are organized so a chunk of size 0x20 will be in index 0, a chunk of size 0x30 would be in index 1...

Chunks in fast bins aren't set as available so they are keep as fast bin chunks for some time instead of being able to merge with other free chunks surrounding them.

// From https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/a07e000e82cb71238259e674529c37c12dc7d423/malloc/malloc.c#L1711

/*
   Fastbins

    An array of lists holding recently freed small chunks.  Fastbins
    are not doubly linked.  It is faster to single-link them, and
    since chunks are never removed from the middles of these lists,
    double linking is not necessary. Also, unlike regular bins, they
    are not even processed in FIFO order (they use faster LIFO) since
    ordering doesn't much matter in the transient contexts in which
    fastbins are normally used.

    Chunks in fastbins keep their inuse bit set, so they cannot
    be consolidated with other free chunks. malloc_consolidate
    releases all chunks in fastbins and consolidates them with
    other free chunks.
 */

typedef struct malloc_chunk *mfastbinptr;
#define fastbin(ar_ptr, idx) ((ar_ptr)->fastbinsY[idx])

/* offset 2 to use otherwise unindexable first 2 bins */
#define fastbin_index(sz) \
  ((((unsigned int) (sz)) >> (SIZE_SZ == 8 ? 4 : 3)) - 2)


/* The maximum fastbin request size we support */
#define MAX_FAST_SIZE     (80 * SIZE_SZ / 4)

#define NFASTBINS  (fastbin_index (request2size (MAX_FAST_SIZE)) + 1)
Add a fastbin chunk example
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main(void) 
{
  char *chunks[8]; 
  int i;

  // Loop to allocate memory 8 times
  for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
    chunks[i] = malloc(24);
    if (chunks[i] == NULL) { // Check if malloc failed
      fprintf(stderr, "Memory allocation failed at iteration %d\n", i);
      return 1;
    }
    printf("Address of chunk %d: %p\n", i, (void *)chunks[i]);
  }

  // Loop to free the allocated memory
  for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
    free(chunks[i]);
  }

  return 0;
}

Note how we allocate and free 8 chunks of the same size so they fill the tcache and the eight one is stored in the fast chunk.

Compile it and debug it with a breakpoint in the ret opcode from main function. then with gef you can see that the tcache bin is full and one chunk is in the fast bin:

gef➤  heap bins
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Tcachebins for thread 1 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Tcachebins[idx=0, size=0x20, count=7] ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1770, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1750, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1730, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1710, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac16f0, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac16d0, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac12a0, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA) 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Fastbins for arena at 0xfffff7f90b00 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Fastbins[idx=0, size=0x20]  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1790, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA) 
Fastbins[idx=1, size=0x30] 0x00

Unsorted bin

The unsorted bin is a cache used by the heap manager to make memory allocation quicker. Here's how it works: When a program frees a chunk, and if this chunk cannot be allocated in a tcache or fast bin and is not colliding with the top chunk, the heap manager doesn't immediately put it in a specific small or large bin. Instead, it first tries to merge it with any neighbouring free chunks to create a larger block of free memory. Then, it places this new chunk in a general bin called the "unsorted bin."

When a program asks for memory, the heap manager checks the unsorted bin to see if there's a chunk of enough size. If it finds one, it uses it right away. If it doesn't find a suitable chunk in the unsorted bin, it moves all the chunks in this list to their corresponding bins, either small or large, based on their size.

Note that if a larger chunk is split in 2 halves and the rest is larger than MINSIZE, it'll be paced back into the unsorted bin.

So, the unsorted bin is a way to speed up memory allocation by quickly reusing recently freed memory and reducing the need for time-consuming searches and merges.

Note that even if chunks are of different categories, if an available chunk is colliding with another available chunk (even if they belong originally to different bins), they will be merged.

Add a unsorted chunk example
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main(void) 
{
  char *chunks[9]; 
  int i;

  // Loop to allocate memory 8 times
  for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) {
    chunks[i] = malloc(0x100);
    if (chunks[i] == NULL) { // Check if malloc failed
      fprintf(stderr, "Memory allocation failed at iteration %d\n", i);
      return 1;
    }
    printf("Address of chunk %d: %p\n", i, (void *)chunks[i]);
  }

  // Loop to free the allocated memory
  for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
    free(chunks[i]);
  }

  return 0;
}

Note how we allocate and free 9 chunks of the same size so they fill the tcache and the eight one is stored in the unsorted bin because it's too big for the fastbin and the nineth one isn't freed so the nineth and the eighth don't get merged with the top chunk.

Compile it and debug it with a breakpoint in the ret opcode from main function. Then with gef you can see that the tcache bin is full and one chunk is in the unsorted bin:

gef➤  heap bins
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Tcachebins for thread 1 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Tcachebins[idx=15, size=0x110, count=7] ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1d10, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1c00, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1af0, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac19e0, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac18d0, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac17c0, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac12a0, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA) 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Fastbins for arena at 0xfffff7f90b00 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Fastbins[idx=0, size=0x20] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=1, size=0x30] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=2, size=0x40] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=3, size=0x50] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=4, size=0x60] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=5, size=0x70] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=6, size=0x80] 0x00
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Unsorted Bin for arena at 0xfffff7f90b00 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[+] unsorted_bins[0]: fw=0xaaaaaaac1e10, bk=0xaaaaaaac1e10
 →   Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1e20, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)
[+] Found 1 chunks in unsorted bin.

Small Bins

Small bins are faster than large bins but slower than fast bins.

Each bin of the 62 will have chunks of the same size: 16, 24, ... (with a max size of 504 bytes in 32bits and 1024 in 64bits). This helps in the speed on finding the bin where a space should be allocated and inserting and removing of entries on these lists.

This is how the size of the small bin is calculated according to the index of the bin:

  • Smallest size: 2*4*index (e.g. index 5 -> 40)

  • Biggest size: 2*8*index (e.g. index 5 -> 80)

// From https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/a07e000e82cb71238259e674529c37c12dc7d423/malloc/malloc.c#L1711
#define NSMALLBINS         64
#define SMALLBIN_WIDTH    MALLOC_ALIGNMENT
#define SMALLBIN_CORRECTION (MALLOC_ALIGNMENT > CHUNK_HDR_SZ)
#define MIN_LARGE_SIZE    ((NSMALLBINS - SMALLBIN_CORRECTION) * SMALLBIN_WIDTH)

#define in_smallbin_range(sz)  \
  ((unsigned long) (sz) < (unsigned long) MIN_LARGE_SIZE)

#define smallbin_index(sz) \
  ((SMALLBIN_WIDTH == 16 ? (((unsigned) (sz)) >> 4) : (((unsigned) (sz)) >> 3))\
   + SMALLBIN_CORRECTION)

Function to choose between small and large bins:

#define bin_index(sz) \
  ((in_smallbin_range (sz)) ? smallbin_index (sz) : largebin_index (sz))
Add a small chunk example
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main(void) 
{
  char *chunks[10]; 
  int i;

  // Loop to allocate memory 8 times
  for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) {
    chunks[i] = malloc(0x100);
    if (chunks[i] == NULL) { // Check if malloc failed
      fprintf(stderr, "Memory allocation failed at iteration %d\n", i);
      return 1;
    }
    printf("Address of chunk %d: %p\n", i, (void *)chunks[i]);
  }

  // Loop to free the allocated memory
  for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
    free(chunks[i]);
  }
  
  chunks[9] = malloc(0x110);

  return 0;
}

Note how we allocate and free 9 chunks of the same size so they fill the tcache and the eight one is stored in the unsorted bin because it's too big for the fastbin and the ninth one isn't freed so the ninth and the eights don't get merged with the top chunk. Then we allocate a bigger chunk of 0x110 which makes the chunk in the unsorted bin goes to the small bin.

Compile it and debug it with a breakpoint in the ret opcode from main function. then with gef you can see that the tcache bin is full and one chunk is in the small bin:

gef➤  heap bins
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Tcachebins for thread 1 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Tcachebins[idx=15, size=0x110, count=7] ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1d10, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1c00, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1af0, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac19e0, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac18d0, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac17c0, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac12a0, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA) 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Fastbins for arena at 0xfffff7f90b00 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Fastbins[idx=0, size=0x20] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=1, size=0x30] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=2, size=0x40] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=3, size=0x50] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=4, size=0x60] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=5, size=0x70] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=6, size=0x80] 0x00
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Unsorted Bin for arena at 0xfffff7f90b00 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[+] Found 0 chunks in unsorted bin.
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Small Bins for arena at 0xfffff7f90b00 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[+] small_bins[16]: fw=0xaaaaaaac1e10, bk=0xaaaaaaac1e10
 →   Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1e20, size=0x110, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)
[+] Found 1 chunks in 1 small non-empty bins.

Large bins

Unlike small bins, which manage chunks of fixed sizes, each large bin handle a range of chunk sizes. This is more flexible, allowing the system to accommodate various sizes without needing a separate bin for each size.

In a memory allocator, large bins start where small bins end. The ranges for large bins grow progressively larger, meaning the first bin might cover chunks from 512 to 576 bytes, while the next covers 576 to 640 bytes. This pattern continues, with the largest bin containing all chunks above 1MB.

Large bins are slower to operate compared to small bins because they must sort and search through a list of varying chunk sizes to find the best fit for an allocation. When a chunk is inserted into a large bin, it has to be sorted, and when memory is allocated, the system must find the right chunk. This extra work makes them slower, but since large allocations are less common than small ones, it's an acceptable trade-off.

There are:

  • 32 bins of 64B range (collide with small bins)

  • 16 bins of 512B range (collide with small bins)

  • 8bins of 4096B range (part collide with small bins)

  • 4bins of 32768B range

  • 2bins of 262144B range

  • 1bin for remaining sizes

Large bin sizes code
// From https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/a07e000e82cb71238259e674529c37c12dc7d423/malloc/malloc.c#L1711

#define largebin_index_32(sz)                                                \
  (((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 6) <= 38) ?  56 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 6) :\
   ((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 9) <= 20) ?  91 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 9) :\
   ((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 12) <= 10) ? 110 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 12) :\
   ((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 15) <= 4) ? 119 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 15) :\
   ((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 18) <= 2) ? 124 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 18) :\
   126)

#define largebin_index_32_big(sz)                                            \
  (((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 6) <= 45) ?  49 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 6) :\
   ((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 9) <= 20) ?  91 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 9) :\
   ((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 12) <= 10) ? 110 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 12) :\
   ((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 15) <= 4) ? 119 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 15) :\
   ((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 18) <= 2) ? 124 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 18) :\
   126)

// XXX It remains to be seen whether it is good to keep the widths of
// XXX the buckets the same or whether it should be scaled by a factor
// XXX of two as well.
#define largebin_index_64(sz)                                                \
  (((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 6) <= 48) ?  48 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 6) :\
   ((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 9) <= 20) ?  91 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 9) :\
   ((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 12) <= 10) ? 110 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 12) :\
   ((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 15) <= 4) ? 119 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 15) :\
   ((((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 18) <= 2) ? 124 + (((unsigned long) (sz)) >> 18) :\
   126)

#define largebin_index(sz) \
  (SIZE_SZ == 8 ? largebin_index_64 (sz)                                     \
   : MALLOC_ALIGNMENT == 16 ? largebin_index_32_big (sz)                     \
   : largebin_index_32 (sz))
Add a large chunk example
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main(void) 
{
  char *chunks[2]; 

  chunks[0] = malloc(0x1500);
  chunks[1] = malloc(0x1500);
  free(chunks[0]);
  chunks[0] = malloc(0x2000);

  return 0;
}

2 large allocations are performed, then on is freed (putting it in the unsorted bin) and a bigger allocation in made (moving the free one from the usorted bin ro the large bin).

Compile it and debug it with a breakpoint in the ret opcode from main function. then with gef you can see that the tcache bin is full and one chunk is in the large bin:

gef➤  heap bin
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Tcachebins for thread 1 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
All tcachebins are empty
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Fastbins for arena at 0xfffff7f90b00 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Fastbins[idx=0, size=0x20] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=1, size=0x30] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=2, size=0x40] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=3, size=0x50] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=4, size=0x60] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=5, size=0x70] 0x00
Fastbins[idx=6, size=0x80] 0x00
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Unsorted Bin for arena at 0xfffff7f90b00 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[+] Found 0 chunks in unsorted bin.
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Small Bins for arena at 0xfffff7f90b00 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[+] Found 0 chunks in 0 small non-empty bins.
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Large Bins for arena at 0xfffff7f90b00 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[+] large_bins[100]: fw=0xaaaaaaac1290, bk=0xaaaaaaac1290
 →   Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac12a0, size=0x1510, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)
[+] Found 1 chunks in 1 large non-empty bins.

Top Chunk

// From https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/a07e000e82cb71238259e674529c37c12dc7d423/malloc/malloc.c#L1711

/*
   Top

    The top-most available chunk (i.e., the one bordering the end of
    available memory) is treated specially. It is never included in
    any bin, is used only if no other chunk is available, and is
    released back to the system if it is very large (see
    M_TRIM_THRESHOLD).  Because top initially
    points to its own bin with initial zero size, thus forcing
    extension on the first malloc request, we avoid having any special
    code in malloc to check whether it even exists yet. But we still
    need to do so when getting memory from system, so we make
    initial_top treat the bin as a legal but unusable chunk during the
    interval between initialization and the first call to
    sysmalloc. (This is somewhat delicate, since it relies on
    the 2 preceding words to be zero during this interval as well.)
 */

/* Conveniently, the unsorted bin can be used as dummy top on first call */
#define initial_top(M)              (unsorted_chunks (M))

Basically, this is a chunk containing all the currently available heap. When a malloc is performed, if there isn't any available free chunk to use, this top chunk will be reducing its size giving the necessary space. The pointer to the Top Chunk is stored in the malloc_state struct.

Moreover, at the beginning, it's possible to use the unsorted chunk as the top chunk.

Observe the Top Chunk example
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h> 

int main(void) 
{
  char *chunk;
  chunk = malloc(24);
  printf("Address of the chunk: %p\n", (void *)chunk);
  gets(chunk);
  return 0;
}

After compiling and debugging it with a break point in the ret opcode of main I saw that the malloc returned the address 0xaaaaaaac12a0 and these are the chunks:

gef➤  heap chunks
Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1010, size=0x290, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)
    [0x0000aaaaaaac1010     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00    ................]
Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac12a0, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)
    [0x0000aaaaaaac12a0     41 41 41 41 41 41 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00    AAAAAAA.........]
Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac12c0, size=0x410, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)
    [0x0000aaaaaaac12c0     41 64 64 72 65 73 73 20 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 63    Address of the c]
Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac16d0, size=0x410, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)
    [0x0000aaaaaaac16d0     41 41 41 41 41 41 41 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00    AAAAAAA.........]
Chunk(addr=0xaaaaaaac1ae0, size=0x20530, flags=PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)  ←  top chunk

Where it can be seen that the top chunk is at address 0xaaaaaaac1ae0. This is no surprise because the last allocated chunk was in 0xaaaaaaac12a0 with a size of 0x410 and 0xaaaaaaac12a0 + 0x410 = 0xaaaaaaac1ae0 . It's also possible to see the length of the Top chunk on its chunk header:

gef➤  x/8wx 0xaaaaaaac1ae0 - 16
0xaaaaaaac1ad0:	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00020531	0x00000000
0xaaaaaaac1ae0:	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000000

Last Remainder

When malloc is used and a chunk is divided (from the unsorted bin or from the top chunk for example), the chunk created from the rest of the divided chunk is called Last Remainder and it's pointer is stored in the malloc_state struct.

Allocation Flow

Check out:

Free Flow

Check out:

Heap Functions Security Checks

Check the security checks performed by heavily used functions in heap in:

References

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malloc & sysmalloc
free
Heap Functions Security Checks
https://azeria-labs.com/heap-exploitation-part-1-understanding-the-glibc-heap-implementation/
https://azeria-labs.com/heap-exploitation-part-2-glibc-heap-free-bins/
https://heap-exploitation.dhavalkapil.com/diving_into_glibc_heap/core_functions
https://ctf-wiki.mahaloz.re/pwn/linux/glibc-heap/implementation/tcache/
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7 same-size chunks
24 to 1032B on 64-bit systems and 12 to 516B on 32-bit systems
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