🤖
hacktricks
  • 👾Welcome!
    • HackTricks
    • HackTricks Values & FAQ
    • About the author
  • 🤩Generic Methodologies & Resources
    • Pentesting Methodology
    • External Recon Methodology
      • Wide Source Code Search
      • Github Dorks & Leaks
    • Pentesting Network
      • DHCPv6
      • EIGRP Attacks
      • GLBP & HSRP Attacks
      • IDS and IPS Evasion
      • Lateral VLAN Segmentation Bypass
      • Network Protocols Explained (ESP)
      • Nmap Summary (ESP)
      • Pentesting IPv6
      • WebRTC DoS
      • Spoofing LLMNR, NBT-NS, mDNS/DNS and WPAD and Relay Attacks
      • Spoofing SSDP and UPnP Devices with EvilSSDP
    • Pentesting Wifi
      • Evil Twin EAP-TLS
    • Phishing Methodology
      • Clone a Website
      • Detecting Phishing
      • Phishing Files & Documents
    • Basic Forensic Methodology
      • Baseline Monitoring
      • Anti-Forensic Techniques
      • Docker Forensics
      • Image Acquisition & Mount
      • Linux Forensics
      • Malware Analysis
      • Memory dump analysis
        • Volatility - CheatSheet
      • Partitions/File Systems/Carving
        • File/Data Carving & Recovery Tools
      • Pcap Inspection
        • DNSCat pcap analysis
        • Suricata & Iptables cheatsheet
        • USB Keystrokes
        • Wifi Pcap Analysis
        • Wireshark tricks
      • Specific Software/File-Type Tricks
        • Decompile compiled python binaries (exe, elf) - Retreive from .pyc
        • Browser Artifacts
        • Deofuscation vbs (cscript.exe)
        • Local Cloud Storage
        • Office file analysis
        • PDF File analysis
        • PNG tricks
        • Video and Audio file analysis
        • ZIPs tricks
      • Windows Artifacts
        • Interesting Windows Registry Keys
    • Brute Force - CheatSheet
    • Python Sandbox Escape & Pyscript
      • Bypass Python sandboxes
        • LOAD_NAME / LOAD_CONST opcode OOB Read
      • Class Pollution (Python's Prototype Pollution)
      • Python Internal Read Gadgets
      • Pyscript
      • venv
      • Web Requests
      • Bruteforce hash (few chars)
      • Basic Python
    • Exfiltration
    • Tunneling and Port Forwarding
    • Threat Modeling
    • Search Exploits
    • Reverse Shells (Linux, Windows, MSFVenom)
      • MSFVenom - CheatSheet
      • Reverse Shells - Windows
      • Reverse Shells - Linux
      • Full TTYs
  • 🐧Linux Hardening
    • Checklist - Linux Privilege Escalation
    • Linux Privilege Escalation
      • Arbitrary File Write to Root
      • Cisco - vmanage
      • Containerd (ctr) Privilege Escalation
      • D-Bus Enumeration & Command Injection Privilege Escalation
      • Docker Security
        • Abusing Docker Socket for Privilege Escalation
        • AppArmor
        • AuthZ& AuthN - Docker Access Authorization Plugin
        • CGroups
        • Docker --privileged
        • Docker Breakout / Privilege Escalation
          • release_agent exploit - Relative Paths to PIDs
          • Docker release_agent cgroups escape
          • Sensitive Mounts
        • Namespaces
          • CGroup Namespace
          • IPC Namespace
          • PID Namespace
          • Mount Namespace
          • Network Namespace
          • Time Namespace
          • User Namespace
          • UTS Namespace
        • Seccomp
        • Weaponizing Distroless
      • Escaping from Jails
      • euid, ruid, suid
      • Interesting Groups - Linux Privesc
        • lxd/lxc Group - Privilege escalation
      • Logstash
      • ld.so privesc exploit example
      • Linux Active Directory
      • Linux Capabilities
      • NFS no_root_squash/no_all_squash misconfiguration PE
      • Node inspector/CEF debug abuse
      • Payloads to execute
      • RunC Privilege Escalation
      • SELinux
      • Socket Command Injection
      • Splunk LPE and Persistence
      • SSH Forward Agent exploitation
      • Wildcards Spare tricks
    • Useful Linux Commands
    • Bypass Linux Restrictions
      • Bypass FS protections: read-only / no-exec / Distroless
        • DDexec / EverythingExec
    • Linux Environment Variables
    • Linux Post-Exploitation
      • PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules
    • FreeIPA Pentesting
  • 🍏MacOS Hardening
    • macOS Security & Privilege Escalation
      • macOS Apps - Inspecting, debugging and Fuzzing
        • Objects in memory
        • Introduction to x64
        • Introduction to ARM64v8
      • macOS AppleFS
      • macOS Bypassing Firewalls
      • macOS Defensive Apps
      • macOS GCD - Grand Central Dispatch
      • macOS Kernel & System Extensions
        • macOS IOKit
        • macOS Kernel Extensions & Debugging
        • macOS Kernel Vulnerabilities
        • macOS System Extensions
      • macOS Network Services & Protocols
      • macOS File Extension & URL scheme app handlers
      • macOS Files, Folders, Binaries & Memory
        • macOS Bundles
        • macOS Installers Abuse
        • macOS Memory Dumping
        • macOS Sensitive Locations & Interesting Daemons
        • macOS Universal binaries & Mach-O Format
      • macOS Objective-C
      • macOS Privilege Escalation
      • macOS Process Abuse
        • macOS Dirty NIB
        • macOS Chromium Injection
        • macOS Electron Applications Injection
        • macOS Function Hooking
        • macOS IPC - Inter Process Communication
          • macOS MIG - Mach Interface Generator
          • macOS XPC
            • macOS XPC Authorization
            • macOS XPC Connecting Process Check
              • macOS PID Reuse
              • macOS xpc_connection_get_audit_token Attack
          • macOS Thread Injection via Task port
        • macOS Java Applications Injection
        • macOS Library Injection
          • macOS Dyld Hijacking & DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
          • macOS Dyld Process
        • macOS Perl Applications Injection
        • macOS Python Applications Injection
        • macOS Ruby Applications Injection
        • macOS .Net Applications Injection
      • macOS Security Protections
        • macOS Gatekeeper / Quarantine / XProtect
        • macOS Launch/Environment Constraints & Trust Cache
        • macOS Sandbox
          • macOS Default Sandbox Debug
          • macOS Sandbox Debug & Bypass
            • macOS Office Sandbox Bypasses
        • macOS Authorizations DB & Authd
        • macOS SIP
        • macOS TCC
          • macOS Apple Events
          • macOS TCC Bypasses
            • macOS Apple Scripts
          • macOS TCC Payloads
        • macOS Dangerous Entitlements & TCC perms
        • macOS - AMFI - AppleMobileFileIntegrity
        • macOS MACF - Mandatory Access Control Framework
        • macOS Code Signing
        • macOS FS Tricks
          • macOS xattr-acls extra stuff
      • macOS Users & External Accounts
    • macOS Red Teaming
      • macOS MDM
        • Enrolling Devices in Other Organisations
        • macOS Serial Number
      • macOS Keychain
    • macOS Useful Commands
    • macOS Auto Start
  • 🪟Windows Hardening
    • Checklist - Local Windows Privilege Escalation
    • Windows Local Privilege Escalation
      • Abusing Tokens
      • Access Tokens
      • ACLs - DACLs/SACLs/ACEs
      • AppendData/AddSubdirectory permission over service registry
      • Create MSI with WIX
      • COM Hijacking
      • Dll Hijacking
        • Writable Sys Path +Dll Hijacking Privesc
      • DPAPI - Extracting Passwords
      • From High Integrity to SYSTEM with Name Pipes
      • Integrity Levels
      • JuicyPotato
      • Leaked Handle Exploitation
      • MSI Wrapper
      • Named Pipe Client Impersonation
      • Privilege Escalation with Autoruns
      • RoguePotato, PrintSpoofer, SharpEfsPotato, GodPotato
      • SeDebug + SeImpersonate copy token
      • SeImpersonate from High To System
      • Windows C Payloads
    • Active Directory Methodology
      • Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
        • Shadow Credentials
      • AD Certificates
        • AD CS Account Persistence
        • AD CS Domain Escalation
        • AD CS Domain Persistence
        • AD CS Certificate Theft
      • AD information in printers
      • AD DNS Records
      • ASREPRoast
      • BloodHound & Other AD Enum Tools
      • Constrained Delegation
      • Custom SSP
      • DCShadow
      • DCSync
      • Diamond Ticket
      • DSRM Credentials
      • External Forest Domain - OneWay (Inbound) or bidirectional
      • External Forest Domain - One-Way (Outbound)
      • Golden Ticket
      • Kerberoast
      • Kerberos Authentication
      • Kerberos Double Hop Problem
      • LAPS
      • MSSQL AD Abuse
      • Over Pass the Hash/Pass the Key
      • Pass the Ticket
      • Password Spraying / Brute Force
      • PrintNightmare
      • Force NTLM Privileged Authentication
      • Privileged Groups
      • RDP Sessions Abuse
      • Resource-based Constrained Delegation
      • Security Descriptors
      • SID-History Injection
      • Silver Ticket
      • Skeleton Key
      • Unconstrained Delegation
    • Windows Security Controls
      • UAC - User Account Control
    • NTLM
      • Places to steal NTLM creds
    • Lateral Movement
      • AtExec / SchtasksExec
      • DCOM Exec
      • PsExec/Winexec/ScExec
      • SmbExec/ScExec
      • WinRM
      • WmiExec
    • Pivoting to the Cloud
    • Stealing Windows Credentials
      • Windows Credentials Protections
      • Mimikatz
      • WTS Impersonator
    • Basic Win CMD for Pentesters
    • Basic PowerShell for Pentesters
      • PowerView/SharpView
    • Antivirus (AV) Bypass
  • 📱Mobile Pentesting
    • Android APK Checklist
    • Android Applications Pentesting
      • Android Applications Basics
      • Android Task Hijacking
      • ADB Commands
      • APK decompilers
      • AVD - Android Virtual Device
      • Bypass Biometric Authentication (Android)
      • content:// protocol
      • Drozer Tutorial
        • Exploiting Content Providers
      • Exploiting a debuggeable application
      • Frida Tutorial
        • Frida Tutorial 1
        • Frida Tutorial 2
        • Frida Tutorial 3
        • Objection Tutorial
      • Google CTF 2018 - Shall We Play a Game?
      • Install Burp Certificate
      • Intent Injection
      • Make APK Accept CA Certificate
      • Manual DeObfuscation
      • React Native Application
      • Reversing Native Libraries
      • Smali - Decompiling/[Modifying]/Compiling
      • Spoofing your location in Play Store
      • Tapjacking
      • Webview Attacks
    • iOS Pentesting Checklist
    • iOS Pentesting
      • iOS App Extensions
      • iOS Basics
      • iOS Basic Testing Operations
      • iOS Burp Suite Configuration
      • iOS Custom URI Handlers / Deeplinks / Custom Schemes
      • iOS Extracting Entitlements From Compiled Application
      • iOS Frida Configuration
      • iOS Hooking With Objection
      • iOS Protocol Handlers
      • iOS Serialisation and Encoding
      • iOS Testing Environment
      • iOS UIActivity Sharing
      • iOS Universal Links
      • iOS UIPasteboard
      • iOS WebViews
    • Cordova Apps
    • Xamarin Apps
  • 👽Network Services Pentesting
    • Pentesting JDWP - Java Debug Wire Protocol
    • Pentesting Printers
    • Pentesting SAP
    • Pentesting VoIP
      • Basic VoIP Protocols
        • SIP (Session Initiation Protocol)
    • Pentesting Remote GdbServer
    • 7/tcp/udp - Pentesting Echo
    • 21 - Pentesting FTP
      • FTP Bounce attack - Scan
      • FTP Bounce - Download 2ºFTP file
    • 22 - Pentesting SSH/SFTP
    • 23 - Pentesting Telnet
    • 25,465,587 - Pentesting SMTP/s
      • SMTP Smuggling
      • SMTP - Commands
    • 43 - Pentesting WHOIS
    • 49 - Pentesting TACACS+
    • 53 - Pentesting DNS
    • 69/UDP TFTP/Bittorrent-tracker
    • 79 - Pentesting Finger
    • 80,443 - Pentesting Web Methodology
      • 403 & 401 Bypasses
      • AEM - Adobe Experience Cloud
      • Angular
      • Apache
      • Artifactory Hacking guide
      • Bolt CMS
      • Buckets
        • Firebase Database
      • CGI
      • DotNetNuke (DNN)
      • Drupal
        • Drupal RCE
      • Electron Desktop Apps
        • Electron contextIsolation RCE via preload code
        • Electron contextIsolation RCE via Electron internal code
        • Electron contextIsolation RCE via IPC
      • Flask
      • NodeJS Express
      • Git
      • Golang
      • GWT - Google Web Toolkit
      • Grafana
      • GraphQL
      • H2 - Java SQL database
      • IIS - Internet Information Services
      • ImageMagick Security
      • JBOSS
      • Jira & Confluence
      • Joomla
      • JSP
      • Laravel
      • Moodle
      • Nginx
      • NextJS
      • PHP Tricks
        • PHP - Useful Functions & disable_functions/open_basedir bypass
          • disable_functions bypass - php-fpm/FastCGI
          • disable_functions bypass - dl function
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP 7.0-7.4 (*nix only)
          • disable_functions bypass - Imagick <= 3.3.0 PHP >= 5.4 Exploit
          • disable_functions - PHP 5.x Shellshock Exploit
          • disable_functions - PHP 5.2.4 ionCube extension Exploit
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP <= 5.2.9 on windows
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP 5.2.4 and 5.2.5 PHP cURL
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP safe_mode bypass via proc_open() and custom environment Exploit
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP Perl Extension Safe_mode Bypass Exploit
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP 5.2.3 - Win32std ext Protections Bypass
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP 5.2 - FOpen Exploit
          • disable_functions bypass - via mem
          • disable_functions bypass - mod_cgi
          • disable_functions bypass - PHP 4 >= 4.2.0, PHP 5 pcntl_exec
        • PHP - RCE abusing object creation: new $_GET["a"]($_GET["b"])
        • PHP SSRF
      • PrestaShop
      • Python
      • Rocket Chat
      • Special HTTP headers
      • Source code Review / SAST Tools
      • Spring Actuators
      • Symfony
      • Tomcat
        • Basic Tomcat Info
      • Uncovering CloudFlare
      • VMWare (ESX, VCenter...)
      • Web API Pentesting
      • WebDav
      • Werkzeug / Flask Debug
      • Wordpress
    • 88tcp/udp - Pentesting Kerberos
      • Harvesting tickets from Windows
      • Harvesting tickets from Linux
    • 110,995 - Pentesting POP
    • 111/TCP/UDP - Pentesting Portmapper
    • 113 - Pentesting Ident
    • 123/udp - Pentesting NTP
    • 135, 593 - Pentesting MSRPC
    • 137,138,139 - Pentesting NetBios
    • 139,445 - Pentesting SMB
      • rpcclient enumeration
    • 143,993 - Pentesting IMAP
    • 161,162,10161,10162/udp - Pentesting SNMP
      • Cisco SNMP
      • SNMP RCE
    • 194,6667,6660-7000 - Pentesting IRC
    • 264 - Pentesting Check Point FireWall-1
    • 389, 636, 3268, 3269 - Pentesting LDAP
    • 500/udp - Pentesting IPsec/IKE VPN
    • 502 - Pentesting Modbus
    • 512 - Pentesting Rexec
    • 513 - Pentesting Rlogin
    • 514 - Pentesting Rsh
    • 515 - Pentesting Line Printer Daemon (LPD)
    • 548 - Pentesting Apple Filing Protocol (AFP)
    • 554,8554 - Pentesting RTSP
    • 623/UDP/TCP - IPMI
    • 631 - Internet Printing Protocol(IPP)
    • 700 - Pentesting EPP
    • 873 - Pentesting Rsync
    • 1026 - Pentesting Rusersd
    • 1080 - Pentesting Socks
    • 1098/1099/1050 - Pentesting Java RMI - RMI-IIOP
    • 1414 - Pentesting IBM MQ
    • 1433 - Pentesting MSSQL - Microsoft SQL Server
      • Types of MSSQL Users
    • 1521,1522-1529 - Pentesting Oracle TNS Listener
    • 1723 - Pentesting PPTP
    • 1883 - Pentesting MQTT (Mosquitto)
    • 2049 - Pentesting NFS Service
    • 2301,2381 - Pentesting Compaq/HP Insight Manager
    • 2375, 2376 Pentesting Docker
    • 3128 - Pentesting Squid
    • 3260 - Pentesting ISCSI
    • 3299 - Pentesting SAPRouter
    • 3306 - Pentesting Mysql
    • 3389 - Pentesting RDP
    • 3632 - Pentesting distcc
    • 3690 - Pentesting Subversion (svn server)
    • 3702/UDP - Pentesting WS-Discovery
    • 4369 - Pentesting Erlang Port Mapper Daemon (epmd)
    • 4786 - Cisco Smart Install
    • 4840 - OPC Unified Architecture
    • 5000 - Pentesting Docker Registry
    • 5353/UDP Multicast DNS (mDNS) and DNS-SD
    • 5432,5433 - Pentesting Postgresql
    • 5439 - Pentesting Redshift
    • 5555 - Android Debug Bridge
    • 5601 - Pentesting Kibana
    • 5671,5672 - Pentesting AMQP
    • 5800,5801,5900,5901 - Pentesting VNC
    • 5984,6984 - Pentesting CouchDB
    • 5985,5986 - Pentesting WinRM
    • 5985,5986 - Pentesting OMI
    • 6000 - Pentesting X11
    • 6379 - Pentesting Redis
    • 8009 - Pentesting Apache JServ Protocol (AJP)
    • 8086 - Pentesting InfluxDB
    • 8089 - Pentesting Splunkd
    • 8333,18333,38333,18444 - Pentesting Bitcoin
    • 9000 - Pentesting FastCGI
    • 9001 - Pentesting HSQLDB
    • 9042/9160 - Pentesting Cassandra
    • 9100 - Pentesting Raw Printing (JetDirect, AppSocket, PDL-datastream)
    • 9200 - Pentesting Elasticsearch
    • 10000 - Pentesting Network Data Management Protocol (ndmp)
    • 11211 - Pentesting Memcache
      • Memcache Commands
    • 15672 - Pentesting RabbitMQ Management
    • 24007,24008,24009,49152 - Pentesting GlusterFS
    • 27017,27018 - Pentesting MongoDB
    • 44134 - Pentesting Tiller (Helm)
    • 44818/UDP/TCP - Pentesting EthernetIP
    • 47808/udp - Pentesting BACNet
    • 50030,50060,50070,50075,50090 - Pentesting Hadoop
  • 🕸️Pentesting Web
    • Web Vulnerabilities Methodology
    • Reflecting Techniques - PoCs and Polygloths CheatSheet
      • Web Vulns List
    • 2FA/MFA/OTP Bypass
    • Account Takeover
    • Browser Extension Pentesting Methodology
      • BrowExt - ClickJacking
      • BrowExt - permissions & host_permissions
      • BrowExt - XSS Example
    • Bypass Payment Process
    • Captcha Bypass
    • Cache Poisoning and Cache Deception
      • Cache Poisoning via URL discrepancies
      • Cache Poisoning to DoS
    • Clickjacking
    • Client Side Template Injection (CSTI)
    • Client Side Path Traversal
    • Command Injection
    • Content Security Policy (CSP) Bypass
      • CSP bypass: self + 'unsafe-inline' with Iframes
    • Cookies Hacking
      • Cookie Tossing
      • Cookie Jar Overflow
      • Cookie Bomb
    • CORS - Misconfigurations & Bypass
    • CRLF (%0D%0A) Injection
    • CSRF (Cross Site Request Forgery)
    • Dangling Markup - HTML scriptless injection
      • SS-Leaks
    • Dependency Confusion
    • Deserialization
      • NodeJS - __proto__ & prototype Pollution
        • Client Side Prototype Pollution
        • Express Prototype Pollution Gadgets
        • Prototype Pollution to RCE
      • Java JSF ViewState (.faces) Deserialization
      • Java DNS Deserialization, GadgetProbe and Java Deserialization Scanner
      • Basic Java Deserialization (ObjectInputStream, readObject)
      • PHP - Deserialization + Autoload Classes
      • CommonsCollection1 Payload - Java Transformers to Rutime exec() and Thread Sleep
      • Basic .Net deserialization (ObjectDataProvider gadget, ExpandedWrapper, and Json.Net)
      • Exploiting __VIEWSTATE knowing the secrets
      • Exploiting __VIEWSTATE without knowing the secrets
      • Python Yaml Deserialization
      • JNDI - Java Naming and Directory Interface & Log4Shell
      • Ruby Class Pollution
    • Domain/Subdomain takeover
    • Email Injections
    • File Inclusion/Path traversal
      • phar:// deserialization
      • LFI2RCE via PHP Filters
      • LFI2RCE via Nginx temp files
      • LFI2RCE via PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS
      • LFI2RCE via Segmentation Fault
      • LFI2RCE via phpinfo()
      • LFI2RCE Via temp file uploads
      • LFI2RCE via Eternal waiting
      • LFI2RCE Via compress.zlib + PHP_STREAM_PREFER_STUDIO + Path Disclosure
    • File Upload
      • PDF Upload - XXE and CORS bypass
    • Formula/CSV/Doc/LaTeX/GhostScript Injection
    • gRPC-Web Pentest
    • HTTP Connection Contamination
    • HTTP Connection Request Smuggling
    • HTTP Request Smuggling / HTTP Desync Attack
      • Browser HTTP Request Smuggling
      • Request Smuggling in HTTP/2 Downgrades
    • HTTP Response Smuggling / Desync
    • Upgrade Header Smuggling
    • hop-by-hop headers
    • IDOR
    • JWT Vulnerabilities (Json Web Tokens)
    • LDAP Injection
    • Login Bypass
      • Login bypass List
    • NoSQL injection
    • OAuth to Account takeover
    • Open Redirect
    • ORM Injection
    • Parameter Pollution
    • Phone Number Injections
    • PostMessage Vulnerabilities
      • Blocking main page to steal postmessage
      • Bypassing SOP with Iframes - 1
      • Bypassing SOP with Iframes - 2
      • Steal postmessage modifying iframe location
    • Proxy / WAF Protections Bypass
    • Race Condition
    • Rate Limit Bypass
    • Registration & Takeover Vulnerabilities
    • Regular expression Denial of Service - ReDoS
    • Reset/Forgotten Password Bypass
    • Reverse Tab Nabbing
    • SAML Attacks
      • SAML Basics
    • Server Side Inclusion/Edge Side Inclusion Injection
    • SQL Injection
      • MS Access SQL Injection
      • MSSQL Injection
      • MySQL injection
        • MySQL File priv to SSRF/RCE
      • Oracle injection
      • Cypher Injection (neo4j)
      • PostgreSQL injection
        • dblink/lo_import data exfiltration
        • PL/pgSQL Password Bruteforce
        • Network - Privesc, Port Scanner and NTLM chanllenge response disclosure
        • Big Binary Files Upload (PostgreSQL)
        • RCE with PostgreSQL Languages
        • RCE with PostgreSQL Extensions
      • SQLMap - CheatSheet
        • Second Order Injection - SQLMap
    • SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery)
      • URL Format Bypass
      • SSRF Vulnerable Platforms
      • Cloud SSRF
    • SSTI (Server Side Template Injection)
      • EL - Expression Language
      • Jinja2 SSTI
    • Timing Attacks
    • Unicode Injection
      • Unicode Normalization
    • UUID Insecurities
    • WebSocket Attacks
    • Web Tool - WFuzz
    • XPATH injection
    • XSLT Server Side Injection (Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations)
    • XXE - XEE - XML External Entity
    • XSS (Cross Site Scripting)
      • Abusing Service Workers
      • Chrome Cache to XSS
      • Debugging Client Side JS
      • Dom Clobbering
      • DOM Invader
      • DOM XSS
      • Iframes in XSS, CSP and SOP
      • Integer Overflow
      • JS Hoisting
      • Misc JS Tricks & Relevant Info
      • PDF Injection
      • Server Side XSS (Dynamic PDF)
      • Shadow DOM
      • SOME - Same Origin Method Execution
      • Sniff Leak
      • Steal Info JS
      • XSS in Markdown
    • XSSI (Cross-Site Script Inclusion)
    • XS-Search/XS-Leaks
      • Connection Pool Examples
      • Connection Pool by Destination Example
      • Cookie Bomb + Onerror XS Leak
      • URL Max Length - Client Side
      • performance.now example
      • performance.now + Force heavy task
      • Event Loop Blocking + Lazy images
      • JavaScript Execution XS Leak
      • CSS Injection
        • CSS Injection Code
    • Iframe Traps
  • ⛈️Cloud Security
    • Pentesting Kubernetes
    • Pentesting Cloud (AWS, GCP, Az...)
    • Pentesting CI/CD (Github, Jenkins, Terraform...)
  • 😎Hardware/Physical Access
    • Physical Attacks
    • Escaping from KIOSKs
    • Firmware Analysis
      • Bootloader testing
      • Firmware Integrity
  • 🎯Binary Exploitation
    • Basic Stack Binary Exploitation Methodology
      • ELF Basic Information
      • Exploiting Tools
        • PwnTools
    • Stack Overflow
      • Pointer Redirecting
      • Ret2win
        • Ret2win - arm64
      • Stack Shellcode
        • Stack Shellcode - arm64
      • Stack Pivoting - EBP2Ret - EBP chaining
      • Uninitialized Variables
    • ROP - Return Oriented Programing
      • BROP - Blind Return Oriented Programming
      • Ret2csu
      • Ret2dlresolve
      • Ret2esp / Ret2reg
      • Ret2lib
        • Leaking libc address with ROP
          • Leaking libc - template
        • One Gadget
        • Ret2lib + Printf leak - arm64
      • Ret2syscall
        • Ret2syscall - ARM64
      • Ret2vDSO
      • SROP - Sigreturn-Oriented Programming
        • SROP - ARM64
    • Array Indexing
    • Integer Overflow
    • Format Strings
      • Format Strings - Arbitrary Read Example
      • Format Strings Template
    • Libc Heap
      • Bins & Memory Allocations
      • Heap Memory Functions
        • free
        • malloc & sysmalloc
        • unlink
        • Heap Functions Security Checks
      • Use After Free
        • First Fit
      • Double Free
      • Overwriting a freed chunk
      • Heap Overflow
      • Unlink Attack
      • Fast Bin Attack
      • Unsorted Bin Attack
      • Large Bin Attack
      • Tcache Bin Attack
      • Off by one overflow
      • House of Spirit
      • House of Lore | Small bin Attack
      • House of Einherjar
      • House of Force
      • House of Orange
      • House of Rabbit
      • House of Roman
    • Common Binary Exploitation Protections & Bypasses
      • ASLR
        • Ret2plt
        • Ret2ret & Reo2pop
      • CET & Shadow Stack
      • Libc Protections
      • Memory Tagging Extension (MTE)
      • No-exec / NX
      • PIE
        • BF Addresses in the Stack
      • Relro
      • Stack Canaries
        • BF Forked & Threaded Stack Canaries
        • Print Stack Canary
    • Write What Where 2 Exec
      • WWW2Exec - atexit()
      • WWW2Exec - .dtors & .fini_array
      • WWW2Exec - GOT/PLT
      • WWW2Exec - __malloc_hook & __free_hook
    • Common Exploiting Problems
    • Windows Exploiting (Basic Guide - OSCP lvl)
    • iOS Exploiting
  • 🔩Reversing
    • Reversing Tools & Basic Methods
      • Angr
        • Angr - Examples
      • Z3 - Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT)
      • Cheat Engine
      • Blobrunner
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On this page
  • Heap Basics
  • Basic Chunk Allocation
  • Arenas
  • Subheaps
  • heap_info
  • malloc_state
  • malloc_chunk
  • Chunk Pointers
  • Alignment & min size
  • Get Chunk data and alter metadata
  • Examples
  • Quick Heap Example
  • Multithreading Example
  • Bins & Memory Allocations/Frees
  • Heap Functions Security Checks
  • References
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  1. Binary Exploitation

Libc Heap

PreviousFormat Strings TemplateNextBins & Memory Allocations

Last updated 7 months ago

Heap Basics

The heap is basically the place where a program is going to be able to store data when it requests data calling functions like malloc, calloc... Moreover, when this memory is no longer needed it's made available calling the function free.

As it's shown, its just after where the binary is being loaded in memory (check the [heap] section):

Basic Chunk Allocation

When some data is requested to be stored in the heap, some space of the heap is allocated to it. This space will belong to a bin and only the requested data + the space of the bin headers + minimum bin size offset will be reserved for the chunk. The goal is to just reserve as minimum memory as possible without making it complicated to find where each chunk is. For this, the metadata chunk information is used to know where each used/free chunk is.

There are different ways to reserver the space mainly depending on the used bin, but a general methodology is the following:

  • The program starts by requesting certain amount of memory.

  • If in the list of chunks there someone available big enough to fulfil the request, it'll be used

    • This might even mean that part of the available chunk will be used for this request and the rest will be added to the chunks list

  • If there isn't any available chunk in the list but there is still space in allocated heap memory, the heap manager creates a new chunk

  • If there is not enough heap space to allocate the new chunk, the heap manager asks the kernel to expand the memory allocated to the heap and then use this memory to generate the new chunk

  • If everything fails, malloc returns null.

Note that if the requested memory passes a threshold, mmap will be used to map the requested memory.

Arenas

In multithreaded applications, the heap manager must prevent race conditions that could lead to crashes. Initially, this was done using a global mutex to ensure that only one thread could access the heap at a time, but this caused performance issues due to the mutex-induced bottleneck.

To address this, the ptmalloc2 heap allocator introduced "arenas," where each arena acts as a separate heap with its own data structures and mutex, allowing multiple threads to perform heap operations without interfering with each other, as long as they use different arenas.

The default "main" arena handles heap operations for single-threaded applications. When new threads are added, the heap manager assigns them secondary arenas to reduce contention. It first attempts to attach each new thread to an unused arena, creating new ones if needed, up to a limit of 2 times the number of CPU cores for 32-bit systems and 8 times for 64-bit systems. Once the limit is reached, threads must share arenas, leading to potential contention.

Unlike the main arena, which expands using the brk system call, secondary arenas create "subheaps" using mmap and mprotect to simulate the heap behaviour, allowing flexibility in managing memory for multithreaded operations.

Subheaps

Subheaps serve as memory reserves for secondary arenas in multithreaded applications, allowing them to grow and manage their own heap regions separately from the main heap. Here's how subheaps differ from the initial heap and how they operate:

  1. Initial Heap vs. Subheaps:

    • The initial heap is located directly after the program's binary in memory, and it expands using the sbrk system call.

    • Subheaps, used by secondary arenas, are created through mmap, a system call that maps a specified memory region.

  2. Memory Reservation with mmap:

    • When the heap manager creates a subheap, it reserves a large block of memory through mmap. This reservation doesn't allocate memory immediately; it simply designates a region that other system processes or allocations shouldn't use.

    • By default, the reserved size for a subheap is 1 MB for 32-bit processes and 64 MB for 64-bit processes.

  3. Gradual Expansion with mprotect:

    • The reserved memory region is initially marked as PROT_NONE, indicating that the kernel doesn't need to allocate physical memory to this space yet.

    • To "grow" the subheap, the heap manager uses mprotect to change page permissions from PROT_NONE to PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, prompting the kernel to allocate physical memory to the previously reserved addresses. This step-by-step approach allows the subheap to expand as needed.

    • Once the entire subheap is exhausted, the heap manager creates a new subheap to continue allocation.

heap_info

This struct allocates relevant information of the heap. Moreover, heap memory might not be continuous after more allocations, this struct will also store that info.

// From https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/a07e000e82cb71238259e674529c37c12dc7d423/malloc/arena.c#L837

typedef struct _heap_info
{
  mstate ar_ptr; /* Arena for this heap. */
  struct _heap_info *prev; /* Previous heap. */
  size_t size;   /* Current size in bytes. */
  size_t mprotect_size; /* Size in bytes that has been mprotected
                           PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE.  */
  size_t pagesize; /* Page size used when allocating the arena.  */
  /* Make sure the following data is properly aligned, particularly
     that sizeof (heap_info) + 2 * SIZE_SZ is a multiple of
     MALLOC_ALIGNMENT. */
  char pad[-3 * SIZE_SZ & MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK];
} heap_info;

malloc_state

Each heap (main arena or other threads arenas) has a malloc_state structure. It’s important to notice that the main arena malloc_state structure is a global variable in the libc (therefore located in the libc memory space). In the case of malloc_state structures of the heaps of threads, they are located inside own thread "heap".

There some interesting things to note from this structure (see C code below):

  • __libc_lock_define (, mutex); Is there to make sure this structure from the heap is accessed by 1 thread at a time

  • Flags:

    • #define NONCONTIGUOUS_BIT     (2U)
      
      #define contiguous(M)          (((M)->flags & NONCONTIGUOUS_BIT) == 0)
      #define noncontiguous(M)       (((M)->flags & NONCONTIGUOUS_BIT) != 0)
      #define set_noncontiguous(M)   ((M)->flags |= NONCONTIGUOUS_BIT)
      #define set_contiguous(M)      ((M)->flags &= ~NONCONTIGUOUS_BIT)
  • The mchunkptr bins[NBINS * 2 - 2]; contains pointers to the first and last chunks of the small, large and unsorted bins (the -2 is because the index 0 is not used)

    • Therefore, the first chunk of these bins will have a backwards pointer to this structure and the last chunk of these bins will have a forward pointer to this structure. Which basically means that if you can leak these addresses in the main arena you will have a pointer to the structure in the libc.

  • The structs struct malloc_state *next; and struct malloc_state *next_free; are linked lists os arenas

  • The top chunk is the last "chunk", which is basically all the heap reminding space. Once the top chunk is "empty", the heap is completely used and it needs to request more space.

  • The last reminder chunk comes from cases where an exact size chunk is not available and therefore a bigger chunk is splitter, a pointer remaining part is placed here.

// From https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/a07e000e82cb71238259e674529c37c12dc7d423/malloc/malloc.c#L1812

struct malloc_state
{
  /* Serialize access.  */
  __libc_lock_define (, mutex);

  /* Flags (formerly in max_fast).  */
  int flags;

  /* Set if the fastbin chunks contain recently inserted free blocks.  */
  /* Note this is a bool but not all targets support atomics on booleans.  */
  int have_fastchunks;

  /* Fastbins */
  mfastbinptr fastbinsY[NFASTBINS];

  /* Base of the topmost chunk -- not otherwise kept in a bin */
  mchunkptr top;

  /* The remainder from the most recent split of a small request */
  mchunkptr last_remainder;

  /* Normal bins packed as described above */
  mchunkptr bins[NBINS * 2 - 2];

  /* Bitmap of bins */
  unsigned int binmap[BINMAPSIZE];

  /* Linked list */
  struct malloc_state *next;

  /* Linked list for free arenas.  Access to this field is serialized
     by free_list_lock in arena.c.  */
  struct malloc_state *next_free;

  /* Number of threads attached to this arena.  0 if the arena is on
     the free list.  Access to this field is serialized by
     free_list_lock in arena.c.  */
  INTERNAL_SIZE_T attached_threads;

  /* Memory allocated from the system in this arena.  */
  INTERNAL_SIZE_T system_mem;
  INTERNAL_SIZE_T max_system_mem;
};

malloc_chunk

This structure represents a particular chunk of memory. The various fields have different meaning for allocated and unallocated chunks.

// https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/master/malloc/malloc.c
struct malloc_chunk {
  INTERNAL_SIZE_T      mchunk_prev_size;  /* Size of previous chunk, if it is free. */
  INTERNAL_SIZE_T      mchunk_size;       /* Size in bytes, including overhead. */
  struct malloc_chunk* fd;                /* double links -- used only if this chunk is free. */
  struct malloc_chunk* bk;
  /* Only used for large blocks: pointer to next larger size.  */
  struct malloc_chunk* fd_nextsize; /* double links -- used only if this chunk is free. */
  struct malloc_chunk* bk_nextsize;
};

typedef struct malloc_chunk* mchunkptr;

As commented previously, these chunks also have some metadata, very good represented in this image:

The metadata is usually 0x08B indicating the current chunk size using the last 3 bits to indicate:

  • A: If 1 it comes from a subheap, if 0 it's in the main arena

  • M: If 1, this chunk is part of a space allocated with mmap and not part of a heap

  • P: If 1, the previous chunk is in use

Then, the space for the user data, and finally 0x08B to indicate the previous chunk size when the chunk is available (or to store user data when it's allocated).

Moreover, when available, the user data is used to contain also some data:

  • fd: Pointer to the next chunk

  • bk: Pointer to the previous chunk

  • fd_nextsize: Pointer to the first chunk in the list is smaller than itself

  • bk_nextsize: Pointer to the first chunk the list that is larger than itself

Note how liking the list this way prevents the need to having an array where every single chunk is being registered.

Chunk Pointers

When malloc is used a pointer to the content that can be written is returned (just after the headers), however, when managing chunks, it's needed a pointer to the begining of the headers (metadata). For these conversions these functions are used:

// https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/master/malloc/malloc.c

/* Convert a chunk address to a user mem pointer without correcting the tag.  */
#define chunk2mem(p) ((void*)((char*)(p) + CHUNK_HDR_SZ))

/* Convert a user mem pointer to a chunk address and extract the right tag.  */
#define mem2chunk(mem) ((mchunkptr)tag_at (((char*)(mem) - CHUNK_HDR_SZ)))

/* The smallest possible chunk */
#define MIN_CHUNK_SIZE        (offsetof(struct malloc_chunk, fd_nextsize))

/* The smallest size we can malloc is an aligned minimal chunk */

#define MINSIZE  \
  (unsigned long)(((MIN_CHUNK_SIZE+MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK) & ~MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK))

Alignment & min size

The pointer to the chunk and 0x0f must be 0.

// From https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/a07e000e82cb71238259e674529c37c12dc7d423/sysdeps/generic/malloc-size.h#L61
#define MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK (MALLOC_ALIGNMENT - 1)

// https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/a07e000e82cb71238259e674529c37c12dc7d423/sysdeps/i386/malloc-alignment.h
#define MALLOC_ALIGNMENT 16


// https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/master/malloc/malloc.c
/* Check if m has acceptable alignment */
#define aligned_OK(m)  (((unsigned long)(m) & MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK) == 0)

#define misaligned_chunk(p) \
  ((uintptr_t)(MALLOC_ALIGNMENT == CHUNK_HDR_SZ ? (p) : chunk2mem (p)) \
   & MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK)
   

/* pad request bytes into a usable size -- internal version */
/* Note: This must be a macro that evaluates to a compile time constant
   if passed a literal constant.  */
#define request2size(req)                                         \
  (((req) + SIZE_SZ + MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK < MINSIZE)  ?             \
   MINSIZE :                                                      \
   ((req) + SIZE_SZ + MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK) & ~MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK)

/* Check if REQ overflows when padded and aligned and if the resulting
   value is less than PTRDIFF_T.  Returns the requested size or
   MINSIZE in case the value is less than MINSIZE, or 0 if any of the
   previous checks fail.  */
static inline size_t
checked_request2size (size_t req) __nonnull (1)
{
  if (__glibc_unlikely (req > PTRDIFF_MAX))
    return 0;

  /* When using tagged memory, we cannot share the end of the user
     block with the header for the next chunk, so ensure that we
     allocate blocks that are rounded up to the granule size.  Take
     care not to overflow from close to MAX_SIZE_T to a small
     number.  Ideally, this would be part of request2size(), but that
     must be a macro that produces a compile time constant if passed
     a constant literal.  */
  if (__glibc_unlikely (mtag_enabled))
    {
      /* Ensure this is not evaluated if !mtag_enabled, see gcc PR 99551.  */
      asm ("");

      req = (req + (__MTAG_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)) &
	    ~(size_t)(__MTAG_GRANULE_SIZE - 1);
    }

  return request2size (req);
}

Note that for calculating the total space needed it's only added SIZE_SZ 1 time because the prev_size field can be used to store data, therefore only the initial header is needed.

Get Chunk data and alter metadata

These functions work by receiving a pointer to a chunk and are useful to check/set metadata:

  • Check chunk flags

// From https://github.com/bminor/glibc/blob/master/malloc/malloc.c


/* size field is or'ed with PREV_INUSE when previous adjacent chunk in use */
#define PREV_INUSE 0x1

/* extract inuse bit of previous chunk */
#define prev_inuse(p)       ((p)->mchunk_size & PREV_INUSE)


/* size field is or'ed with IS_MMAPPED if the chunk was obtained with mmap() */
#define IS_MMAPPED 0x2

/* check for mmap()'ed chunk */
#define chunk_is_mmapped(p) ((p)->mchunk_size & IS_MMAPPED)


/* size field is or'ed with NON_MAIN_ARENA if the chunk was obtained
   from a non-main arena.  This is only set immediately before handing
   the chunk to the user, if necessary.  */
#define NON_MAIN_ARENA 0x4

/* Check for chunk from main arena.  */
#define chunk_main_arena(p) (((p)->mchunk_size & NON_MAIN_ARENA) == 0)

/* Mark a chunk as not being on the main arena.  */
#define set_non_main_arena(p) ((p)->mchunk_size |= NON_MAIN_ARENA)
  • Sizes and pointers to other chunks

/*
   Bits to mask off when extracting size

   Note: IS_MMAPPED is intentionally not masked off from size field in
   macros for which mmapped chunks should never be seen. This should
   cause helpful core dumps to occur if it is tried by accident by
   people extending or adapting this malloc.
 */
#define SIZE_BITS (PREV_INUSE | IS_MMAPPED | NON_MAIN_ARENA)

/* Get size, ignoring use bits */
#define chunksize(p) (chunksize_nomask (p) & ~(SIZE_BITS))

/* Like chunksize, but do not mask SIZE_BITS.  */
#define chunksize_nomask(p)         ((p)->mchunk_size)

/* Ptr to next physical malloc_chunk. */
#define next_chunk(p) ((mchunkptr) (((char *) (p)) + chunksize (p)))

/* Size of the chunk below P.  Only valid if !prev_inuse (P).  */
#define prev_size(p) ((p)->mchunk_prev_size)

/* Set the size of the chunk below P.  Only valid if !prev_inuse (P).  */
#define set_prev_size(p, sz) ((p)->mchunk_prev_size = (sz))

/* Ptr to previous physical malloc_chunk.  Only valid if !prev_inuse (P).  */
#define prev_chunk(p) ((mchunkptr) (((char *) (p)) - prev_size (p)))

/* Treat space at ptr + offset as a chunk */
#define chunk_at_offset(p, s)  ((mchunkptr) (((char *) (p)) + (s)))
  • Insue bit

/* extract p's inuse bit */
#define inuse(p)							      \
  ((((mchunkptr) (((char *) (p)) + chunksize (p)))->mchunk_size) & PREV_INUSE)

/* set/clear chunk as being inuse without otherwise disturbing */
#define set_inuse(p)							      \
  ((mchunkptr) (((char *) (p)) + chunksize (p)))->mchunk_size |= PREV_INUSE

#define clear_inuse(p)							      \
  ((mchunkptr) (((char *) (p)) + chunksize (p)))->mchunk_size &= ~(PREV_INUSE)


/* check/set/clear inuse bits in known places */
#define inuse_bit_at_offset(p, s)					      \
  (((mchunkptr) (((char *) (p)) + (s)))->mchunk_size & PREV_INUSE)

#define set_inuse_bit_at_offset(p, s)					      \
  (((mchunkptr) (((char *) (p)) + (s)))->mchunk_size |= PREV_INUSE)

#define clear_inuse_bit_at_offset(p, s)					      \
  (((mchunkptr) (((char *) (p)) + (s)))->mchunk_size &= ~(PREV_INUSE))
  • Set head and footer (when chunk nos in use

/* Set size at head, without disturbing its use bit */
#define set_head_size(p, s)  ((p)->mchunk_size = (((p)->mchunk_size & SIZE_BITS) | (s)))

/* Set size/use field */
#define set_head(p, s)       ((p)->mchunk_size = (s))

/* Set size at footer (only when chunk is not in use) */
#define set_foot(p, s)       (((mchunkptr) ((char *) (p) + (s)))->mchunk_prev_size = (s))
  • Get the size of the real usable data inside the chunk

#pragma GCC poison mchunk_size
#pragma GCC poison mchunk_prev_size

/* This is the size of the real usable data in the chunk.  Not valid for
   dumped heap chunks.  */
#define memsize(p)                                                    \
  (__MTAG_GRANULE_SIZE > SIZE_SZ && __glibc_unlikely (mtag_enabled) ? \
    chunksize (p) - CHUNK_HDR_SZ :                                    \
    chunksize (p) - CHUNK_HDR_SZ + (chunk_is_mmapped (p) ? 0 : SIZE_SZ))

/* If memory tagging is enabled the layout changes to accommodate the granule
   size, this is wasteful for small allocations so not done by default.
   Both the chunk header and user data has to be granule aligned.  */
_Static_assert (__MTAG_GRANULE_SIZE <= CHUNK_HDR_SZ,
		"memory tagging is not supported with large granule.");

static __always_inline void *
tag_new_usable (void *ptr)
{
  if (__glibc_unlikely (mtag_enabled) && ptr)
    {
      mchunkptr cp = mem2chunk(ptr);
      ptr = __libc_mtag_tag_region (__libc_mtag_new_tag (ptr), memsize (cp));
    }
  return ptr;
}

Examples

Quick Heap Example

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

void main(void)
{
    char *ptr;
    ptr = malloc(0x10);
    strcpy(ptr, "panda");
}

Set a breakpoint at the end of the main function and lets find out where the information was stored:

It's possible to see that the string panda was stored at 0xaaaaaaac12a0 (which was the address given as response by malloc inside x0). Checking 0x10 bytes before it's possible to see that the 0x0 represents that the previous chunk is not used (length 0) and that the length of this chunk is 0x21.

The extra spaces reserved (0x21-0x10=0x11) comes from the added headers (0x10) and 0x1 doesn't mean that it was reserved 0x21B but the last 3 bits of the length of the current headed have the some special meanings. As the length is always 16-byte aligned (in 64bits machines), these bits are actually never going to be used by the length number.

0x1:     Previous in Use     - Specifies that the chunk before it in memory is in use
0x2:     Is MMAPPED          - Specifies that the chunk was obtained with mmap()
0x4:     Non Main Arena      - Specifies that the chunk was obtained from outside of the main arena

Multithreading Example

Multithread
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>


void* threadFuncMalloc(void* arg) {
    printf("Hello from thread 1\n");
    char* addr = (char*) malloc(1000);
    printf("After malloc and before free in thread 1\n");
    free(addr);
    printf("After free in thread 1\n");
}

void* threadFuncNoMalloc(void* arg) {
    printf("Hello from thread 2\n");
}


int main() {
    pthread_t t1;
    void* s;
    int ret;
    char* addr;

    printf("Before creating thread 1\n");
    getchar();
    ret = pthread_create(&t1, NULL, threadFuncMalloc, NULL);
    getchar();

    printf("Before creating thread 2\n");
    ret = pthread_create(&t1, NULL, threadFuncNoMalloc, NULL);

    printf("Before exit\n");
    getchar();

    return 0;
}

Debugging the previous example it's possible to see how at the beginning there is only 1 arena:

Then, after calling the first thread, the one that calls malloc, a new arena is created:

and inside of it some chunks can be found:

Bins & Memory Allocations/Frees

Check what are the bins and how are they organized and how memory is allocated and freed in:

Heap Functions Security Checks

Functions involved in heap will perform certain check before performing its actions to try to make sure the heap wasn't corrupted:

References

Quick heap example from but in arm64:

🎯
https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/25-heap/index.html
Bins & Memory Allocations
Heap Functions Security Checks
https://azeria-labs.com/heap-exploitation-part-1-understanding-the-glibc-heap-implementation/
https://azeria-labs.com/heap-exploitation-part-2-glibc-heap-free-bins/
https://azeria-labs.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/chunk-allocated-CS.png
https://azeria-labs.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/chunk-allocated-CS.png